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ABSTRACT 
Author: Janora, John J. 
Degree: Master of Arts in History 
Institution: State University of New York, College at Buffalo 
Received: Spring 2018 
Title: An Analysis Considering the Significance of the Seventeenth Amendment: The 
United States Senate and the Transformation from Legislative Selection to Direct 
Popular Election 
Major Professor: Dr. David Carson 
 The passage of the Seventeenth Amendment helped to democratize the United 
States Senate and tied the legislative branch closer to the people, but it undermined the 
links between the state and the federal systems.  Any thoughtful discussion on the 
Progressive Era will generally lead towards the idea of increased involvement of both 
the government, at all levels, in the lives of the general population, and the increased 
involvement of the general population in the functioning of the government at large.  
One seemingly obvious decision made in the early part of the 20th century was the 
implementation of the Seventeenth Amendment, which led to the direct election of 
United States senators.  No longer would deals made in “smoky backrooms” and with 
ix 
 
corrupt state legislators have a say on who would represent state interests best at the 
national level.  In its place would be an individual who would be more representative of 
the people’s will and ideological bend.  The debates over the adoption and ratification of 
the Seventeenth Amendment, in the popular press, the public, in state legislatures, and 
in Congress focus almost entirely on the expansion of democracy and the elimination of 
corruption, but did not have any real discussion on the impact on federalism and the 
original intent of the United States Constitution.   
 The motivation of this document is the discussion of the corruption in the era 
preceding the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment.  The subsequent issue, and 
the primary problem to be considered, will be the issues of corruption that have 
happened since the adoption of the amendment, and if its adoption has had a positive, 
negative, or neutral effect on the Senate.  Through the comparison of the pre-
Seventeenth and post-Seventeenth Amendment eras, with assessments of moral, 
ethical, and legal issues senators have faced, it will be determined whether the 
Seventeenth Amendment had the effect on American society as it was calculated to 
accomplish, or if it was of minimal, or even detrimental, consequence on the 
comportment of the United States Senate and the actions of the federal government. 
These ideas will be investigated in order to see if malfeasance was and still is as 
common a concern as is typically understood. 
 Information and analysis was completed by using a wide array of primary and 
secondary sources.  There are numerous newspaper and news magazine articles 
concurrent to specific situations from the eras debated.  Historical, political science, and 
law journals give a wide range of contemporaneous attitudes and discussions among 
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several professional fields, along with more current interpretations of past events.  
Traditional scholarly research, the venerated text The Federalist Papers, along with 
commentary from various senators, presidents (particularly Theodore Roosevelt), 
Supreme Court members, and primeval versions of investigative journalists add to the 
discussion through public dialogues, the consistent introduction of new laws, and the 
exposure of underhanded dealings that allowed corruption to apparently thrive for 
decades. 
 Ideas as to how to fix issues with the selection process of United States senators 
could have possibly lowered external influence on the legislative process without 
dramatically changing the Constitution, changes that will be shown to have had little real 
effect on how senators act.  Instead of the “Captains of Industry” of years past, there are 
now lobbyists, corporate interests, and special interests doing much the same, but now 
referring to the system as fundraising instead of bribery.  In conflict to most modern 
perceptions, it was seen as important to have direct elections of United States not 
because of fraud, nepotism, or blatant disregard of the law or tradition, but primarily 
because some states, at times, had years of no proper representation.  Many state 
legislatures simply saw the amendment as was way to ensure proper representation for 
their state.   
   
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
If you look at the minutes of the Constitutional Convention - which we  
have – Madison, who was the main framer, proceeded to develop a  
system in which - as he put it - power would be in the hands of the wealth  
of the nation, the more responsible set of men and who recognize the 
need to protect the rights of property owners. That's why in the  
constitutional system, the most powerful part of the whole system is  
the Senate. 
 
- Noam Chomsky1 
An August Selection of Gentlemen 
 The name Senate on its own can cause a reader to recall the distinguished body 
that helped to build Rome into a world superpower.  Historical notables such as Brutus, 
Publius, Cincinnatus, Scipio, Cato, amongst many others, sat at the vanguard of Roman 
greatness, ensuring stability and wisdom were available to the subjects of the emperor, 
that foreign threats were minimized, and probably just as important, that popular opinion 
was allowed to cool before impulsive laws took effect.2  Its modern version, the upper 
house of the United States legislature, has been referred to as both the world’s greatest 
debating society and at the same time a huge road block to the efficient 
accomplishment of governmental responsibilities.  In The Federalist Papers opponents 
and supporters wrote under Roman senator nom de plumes, debating the Senate’s 
development and arguing its proper role in a democratic/republican society.3 
                                                          
 1 Jegan  Vincent de Paul. ”Noam Chomsky interviewed by Jegan Vincent de Paul.” Compare and Contrast: 
Codes of Conduct, with support from the National Endowment for the Arts. August 15th, 2012. 
https://chomsky.info/20120815/. Accessed online 29 December 2017. 
 2 Daniel Wirls and Stephen Wirls. The Invention of the United States Senate. Baltimore, Maryland and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004. p. 1. 
 3 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison. The Federalist Papers. New York: Fall River Press. 
2017. 
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 There has traditionally been an argument that the United States Senate is highly 
unrepresentative of the American people, and this is easy enough to argue if it is 
assumed that the goal of the Founders was to have the Senate represent the general 
population.  State populations in the late 18th century were generally relatively close to 
each other, with outliers such as Virginia (much larger than the norm) and Delaware 
(much smaller than the norm) being the only significant differences to the model.4  
Modern senators represent a significantly diverse and dissimilar number of people, with 
Wyoming having a population one seventieth the population of California.  It can be 
reasoned this was done purposefully by the Founders in order to ensure States were 
treated as equals in one branch of the government, something that would be much 
more difficult to accomplish on a representational basis. This allows smaller, or minority 
population states, to protect themselves against bad acts attempted by larger states.5  
The United States Senate has been described as a majestic deliberative body, and as a 
black hole of argument, the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment did nothing real to 
change this idea.6  
 The Senate was designed for three distinct, yet related, purposes.  First, it was 
instituted to act as a representative of the corporate interests of the many states.  
Secondly, it was to act as a connection or bridge between the executive and legislative 
branches, with responsibilities of both branches morphed into one group.  Third, it was 
to counterbalance the fiery hot actions it was assumed the democratically elected 
                                                          
 4 Frances E. Lee and Bruce Oppenheimer. Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal 
Representation.  Chicago: The University of Chicago  Press.  1999. p. 16. 
 5 Frances E. Lee and Bruce Oppenheimer. Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal 
Representation.  Chicago: The University of Chicago  Press.  1999. p. 19. 
 6 Daniel Wirls and Stephen Wirls. The Invention of the United States Senate. Baltimore, Maryland and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004. p. 214. 
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House of Representatives would constantly find itself immersed in.  The House was 
assumed to be the direct, fast acting mouth piece of the general public, constantly 
pushing for action, while the Senate was supposed to act as the more even-tempered, 
erudite body, using time and debate to solve the issues presented to it in a way that 
would benefit the states.7  
Note: For the purposes of this paper, the use of the term “Progressive Era” will signify 
the intensification of the Populist movement in the 1890s and will peak with the passage 
of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1919.   
 During its history the Senate found itself subject to the weakness of men, with 
various scandals, if not plaguing the body, being omnipresent nonetheless.  To solve 
this issue Progressive Era politicians, and the public at large, pushed for a more 
representative body, one which would mirror the opinion of the general public more 
closely, and one that would remove the perception that senatorships could be bought 
and sold, favors gained, and any number of other undemocratic principles.  A potential 
concern with this idea was that the problems, though in existence to a point, were not as 
pervasive as is commonly currently believed.  The issues that were present were also 
not necessarily because of structural deficiencies in how senators were selected by 
their various states, but because of the general fallibility of men.  Problems that existed 
before the Seventeenth Amendment still exist to this day, over a century after the United 
                                                          
 7 C. Herman Pritchett. "Congressional Membership." Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, edited by 
Leonard  W. Levy and Kenneth L. Karst, 2nd ed., vol. 2, Macmillan Reference USA, 2000, pp. 500-501. 
http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/CX3425000566/GVRL?u=buffalostate&sid=GVRL&xid=ba06789e. Accessed 25 
June 2018. 
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States Constitution was altered and individual states lost their ability to get proper 
representation at the national level.   
 There is remarkably little historical documentation tied to the passage of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, and even the initial development of the United States Senate.  
What does exist is in a form that seems to agree with the modern belief that the primary 
goal of the amendment’s passage was to ensure that big businesses, trusts, and other 
bad actors were limited in the influence they had over individual United States 
senators.8  The debates over the implementation of the Seventeenth Amendment, in the 
press, the public, at the state level, and in Congress focus almost entirely on the 
expansion of democratic principles and the goal of eliminating corruption, but did not 
have any real discussion on the impact on federalism and the original intent of the 
United States Constitution.  The long term effects are of the amendment are typically 
described in statistical analyses and similar type articles, showing how voting trends 
may or may not have changed due to the direct election of United States senators.  This 
stark edict showed the Progressive Era’s wholesome goal of restraining the influence 
business had at all levels of government.  There is even less information about the long 
term effects the amendment has had on modern society, and the material that is 
                                                          
 8 Dennis J. Mahoney. "Seventeenth Amendment." Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, edited by 
Leonard  W. Levy and Kenneth L. Karst, 2nd ed., vol. 5, Macmillan Reference USA, 2000, pp. 2387-2388. Gale Virtual 
Reference Library, 
http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/CX3425002278/GVRL?u=buffalostate&sid=GVRL&xid=80ede9ea. Accessed 25 
June 2018; David Graham Phillips.  The Treason of the Senate.  Original: 1906. Edited with an introduction by 
George E. Mowry and Judson A. Grenier.  Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964. p. 628-638. 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Treason_of_the_Senate.htm. Accessed online 5 January 
2018. 
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available appears to show a tendency to treat it more as an insignificant, add-on activity 
to the Progressive Era, seeming to assume that it was an obvious decision to make and 
not deserving of further analysis.   
 A host of questions need to be answered in order to properly ascertain why the 
Seventeenth Amendment was needed, if it was needed at all.  What was the Founding 
Fathers’ goal in selecting rather than electing United States senators?  Did this goal 
supersede any potential issues that might arise with corruption with specific senators?  
Did the Senate properly reflect the will of the American people better after the 
amendment’s passage, and does this even matter, since the Senate’s original purpose 
was to represent greater state interests?  Was the corruption of the Senate in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries large enough as to force a structural change to the United 
States Constitution?  If so, was the amendment effective in fixing this corruption?  Or, 
was the Seventeenth Amendment a solution in search of a problem?  The primary 
question that needs to be answered is: Was the Seventeenth Amendment a necessary 
action, a violation of the Founders well-reasoned intent, or something different entirely?  
The simple idea that state legislatures, who essentially initiated at state governmental 
levels the idea of direct elections, were almost eager to give away their basic 
Constitutional duties of selecting senators and did so with little relatively little discussion 
of federalism or proper representation of the corporate interests of their individual states 
can be seen as an almost unthinkable relinquishment of authority and power.9   
                                                          
 9 David Schleicher. “The Seventeenth Amendment: Federalism in an Age of National Political Parties.” 
Hastings Law Journal. Hastings College of Law. May 2014. p. 1043. 
http://proxy.buffalostate.edu:2053/hottopics/lnacademic/?shr=t&csi=7341&sr=TITLE("The+Seventeenth+Amend
ment+federalism+in+an+age+of+national+political+parties")+and+date+is+2014.  Accessed online January 11, 
2018. 
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 This paper will specifically research and analyze the events and opinions leading 
up to the implementation of the Seventeenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, including the censures and impeachments of United States Senators 
before and after the amendment was ratified, possibly the only real way to differentiate 
the ante and post direct election eras.  The objective is to integrate these concepts with 
more recent texts, journal, magazine, and newspaper articles that expose some of the 
issues that are tied directly to the implementation of Seventeenth Amendment, the 
founders’ idea of states’ rights, and the reasoning of the importance of equal 
representation between the many states. 
 In answering the previous series of questions it will become evident that the 
Seventeenth Amendment was an unnecessary action leading to the weakening of the 
supremacy the individual states and creating a flawed relationship between the state 
and federal governments.  The original intent of the Constitutional Convention and its 
innovative plan for the United States Senate was senators acting as representatives to 
the states, not directly for the people of those states.  The ratification of the Seventeenth 
Amendment has weakened a needed check against popular opinion and hasty decision 
making.  Instead of the celebrated deliberative body it was designed to be, the Senate 
has been reduced to an ordinary representative body, little different from the House of 
Representatives, which it was intended to counter.  The Seventeenth Amendment 
completed the most noteworthy and significant change in the Senate’s history and 
formed a deviation from the Constitution’s original intent, which was the corporate 
representation of the individual states on the national stage.10 
                                                          
 10 Daniel Wirls and Stephen Wirls. The Invention of the United States Senate. Baltimore,  Maryland and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004. p. 216. 
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 Though counterintuitive to the modern voter and average citizen, personal 
decisions at the ballot box do not always line up with long term benefits that the 
legislative branch might very well be attempting to accomplish.  One of the Founding 
Fathers’ original ideas when authoring the United States Constitution was to have an 
upper house, known as the Senate, be a representative body for the individual states.  
Whereas members of the House of Representatives had to continually run for office and 
keep the majority of the voting population relatively happy, senators did not have to 
worry about momentary public opinion before 1913.  Selected to their positions, they 
were insulated from the news cycle, dealt primarily with state and national level 
politicians, and served a six year term, which further protected them from the capricious 
and ever changing attitudes of the public.  Not directly responsible to the people of the 
many states, the general idea of the Senate was to give the states direct representation 
on the national stage, along with a potential for a “long view” as to the importance of 
specific legislation without each senator having to worry as much about public opinion.  
With each state given equal representation it can be argued the Senate might very well 
be the most important part of any of the branches of government; it allowed the states to 
have their voices heard in both legislation and ruling authority.  Since population 
numbers were not considered in its formation the members, and the debates they would 
have, were seen as more substantial, and states were forced to be accommodating 
towards the others since steamrolling through sheer size of congressional contingent 
was not possible.11 
                                                          
 11 William Smith White. Citadel: The Story of the United States Senate. New York: Harper and Brothers, 
Publishers, 1956. p. 22. 
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 The idea of indirect senatorial selections had been controversial since the 
Constitutional Convention in 1789 and consistent pressure was applied to Congress to 
change the system from very early on.  It came to a crest in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, with the House of Representatives passing popular election amendments in 
each session from 1893 to 1911, but failing to gain traction in the Senate.  The selection 
of United States Senators occurred for the final time in November 1912.  Within the year 
the Seventeenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was adopted.12   
 By the time the Seventeenth Amendment was adopted many states had already 
established mechanisms that essentially allowed voters to choose the senators of their 
state.  A common practice was having the legislature appoint the winners of party 
primaries as senators.  This allowed the citizenry to have a certain say in senate 
representation, but also maintained the state legislatures’ ability to choose who would 
be sent to the Senate. The amendment was widely seen as necessary to reduce the 
apparent influence of big business and other special interests on the selection of 
senators and to prevent vacancies or frequent turnover in the Senate caused by party 
wrangling or changes of party leadership at the state level.13 
 William Jennings Bryan enjoyed a day of victory as the newly minted Secretary of 
State early in the Woodrow Wilson administration. On May 31, 1913, Bryan signed the 
proclamation declaring the 17th Amendment, requiring direct election of U.S. senators, 
duly ratified and incorporated into the Constitution of the United States. Bryan had long 
                                                          
 12 Sara Brandes Crook, and John R. Hibbing. “A Not-so-Distant Mirror: the 17th Amendment and 
Congressional Change.” The American Political Science Review, vol. 91, no. 4, 1997, p. 845. JSTOR, JSTOR, 
www.jstor.org/stable/2952168. 
 13 Brian Duignan. "Seventeenth Amendment. Encyclopædia Britannica, Britannica Academic." 2017. 
proxy.buffalostate.edu:2793/levels/collegiate/article/Seventeenth-Amendment/474646. Accessed 24 Jul. 2017. 
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been in the vanguard of the fight for the amendment, as United States Representative 
and United States Senator from Nebraska, and the three time losing candidate for 
president of the United States.  His statement, an early version of the theory of the 
United States Constitution being a living document, succinctly describes the populist 
mindset of the era: 
What with our daily newspapers and our telegraph facilities we need not  
delegate our powers," declared the Great Commoner. Whatever reasons  
the Founders may have had for requiring election by state legislatures, 
"today under present conditions, those statesmen and patriots would 
undoubtedly be of another opinion.14 
 
The Founding Fathers’ Original Intent for the United States Senate 
 The modern American President is an extremely powerful figure, but this idea 
might be considered an anathema to the men who gathered in Philadelphia in the 
summer of 1787.  After fighting a war against a man seen as a tyrant, it became 
increasingly important that one man never be given such powers, and the idea of 
separation of powers was born.  Instead of the British tradition of one man rule, with a 
parliament called at the pleasure of his majesty, the American system was purposely 
set up with three equal branches, with a purposeful tendency towards inertia and 
stalemate.15  A bicameral legislature with equal authority but different responsibilities 
was developed to mirror most state legislatures of the time.  The House of 
Representatives would be based on a version of direct democratic principles.  The 
Senate was to emulate an aristocratic class.  In the executive branch the office of 
                                                          
 14 Jack Kenny. "The Seventeenth: the worst of all amendments? The 17th Amendment, putting the 
election of U.S. senators in the citizens' hands, instead of the state legislatures, was meant to empower citizens. It 
had the opposite effect." Opposing Viewpoints in Context: The New American, 1 Apr. 2013, p. 35. 
http://link.galegroup.com.proxy.buffalostate.edu/apps/doc/A326854317/OVIC?u=nysl_we_bsc&xid=8b7c4dc6. 
Accessed 25 Mar. 2018. 
 15 Gail Collins. William Henry Harrison. New York: Times Books; Henry Holt and Company. 2012. p. ix. 
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President would reflect the monarchs of Europe.  These positions were argued and a 
version of these ideas were eventually accepted by the newly created nation. This was 
all to be balanced in a way that led to an almost equilibrium, with no individual element 
dominant over the other.16   Historian George Galloway even goes as far as to argue 
that the primary reason for the legislature and the executive branches in general was to 
“confine itself, for the most part, to external affairs of the new nation, leaving the 
conduct of internal affairs to the states and communities.”17 The federal government 
was set up to be the international representative of the nascent country, with most 
internal decisions and obligations centered as close to the people as possible. 
 The original intent of the Founding Fathers’ and the United States Constitution 
was to have a legislatively selected Senate be the representative body for these many 
states, not of the people in general.  The House of Representatives was to be popularly 
elected by the individual voter, with frequent elections, campaigning, and the proverbial 
“kissing of babies.”  The Senate was supposed to be the longer term measure of 
stability that would potentially dampen the tyranny of the majority, having a long term, 
more professional political class answering to the state they were selected to 
represent.18  
 In either manifestation it is important to understand that though serving at the 
pleasure of the people or the legislature, they were guaranteed, unless removed from 
                                                          
 16 John C. Miller. The Federalist Era. New York: Harper Brothers Publishers. 1960. p. 114. 
 17 George B. Galloway. History of the House of Representatives. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 
1961. p. 119. 
 18 C. Herman Pritchett. "Congressional Membership." Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, edited 
by Leonard W. Levy and Kenneth L. Karst, 2nd ed., vol. 2, Macmillan Reference USA, 2000, pp. 500-501. 
http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/CX3425000566/GVRL?u=buffalostate&sid=GVRL&xid=ba06789e. Accessed 25 
June 2018. 
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office through an arduous process, their entire two or six year term.  They were not 
delegates, following instructions from individual districts or states, as the members of 
the Convention nominally were, but more of a trustee, and able to act as a free agent in 
order to gain the most benefit for their state and the nation at large. 19 
 The specific wording for the selection of United States senators in Article 1, 
Section 3 of the United States Constitution states “The Senate of the United States shall 
be composed of two senators from each state, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six 
years;”20 According to Oppenheimer three characteristics not expressly stated in the 
Constitution, but in existence nonetheless, make the United States Senate unusual 
among the world’s upper chambers in that:   
• It shares legislative power equally with its lower partner, in this case, the House 
of Representatives.  
• It operates under a set of rules that rest enormous power in each senator.  
• When majorities rule in the Senate it is only by leave of minorities.21 
 Whereas Article I, Section 3, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution 
specifically called for individual state legislatures to choose a state’s senators, the 
Seventeenth Amendment called for, and eventually mandated, the direct election of 
United States senators by each states’ general electorate.  The Senate and the House 
were designed to act as mutual checks on each other, with the upper house advocating 
                                                          
 19 Norman C. Thomas and Karla Lamb. Congress: Politics and Practice. New York: Random House, 1964. p. 
38. 
 20 The United States Constitution. Article 1, Section 3.  
 21 Bruce I. Oppenheimer. United States Senate Exceptionalism.  Columbus, OH: The Ohio  State University 
Press, 2002. p. 3. 
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for a more long term, disputably more sophisticated outlook of legislative activities and 
embody the idea of federalism and equality amongst the states.  The lower house was 
to align closer to the opinion of the general public.22  Even though the body of laws 
typically discussed as being attached directly to the Progressive Era is at the national 
level (examples include: the Pure Food and Drug Act, various “trust busting measures,” 
and a set of four constitutional amendments covering income taxes, the prohibition of 
alcohol, the direct election of senators, and women’s suffrage), most of the laws 
enacted during this era started typically as grassroots, local initiatives, eventually 
making their way into the state level governments, and ultimately to the federal level.  
Debate at the Constitutional Convention 
 James Madison wrote extensively of the Constitutional Convention debates 
referring to what eventually became equal representation of the states in the United 
States Senate and the corporate representation of the states in the upper house.  He 
stated in his notes that many delegates feared one of two extremes resulting from the 
failure to give states representation at the national level.  The first fear was a “perfect 
separation” of the thirteen states into independent nations, subject only to the law of 
nations.  The second fear was “perfect incorporation,” where the states “would be mere 
counties of one entire republic.”  These fears could only be mitigated by the states 
having representation that was present at the national level, but an argument ensued as 
to whether the states would be represented by population, as the Assembly (or House 
                                                          
 22 Daniel Wirls and Stephen Wirls. The Invention of the United States Senate. Baltimore, Maryland and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004. p. 4. 
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of Representatives) would be, or if there would be equality amongst the states, or if 
something else entirely would be designed.23  
 Early in the convention Madison bandied about different wording such as “an 
equitable ratio of representation” in order to keep open the possibility of counting slaves 
as people for purposes of representation.24 This opened a new debate amongst the 
delegates as to whether states should have equal representation, as they had under the 
Articles of Confederation, or if it should be population based.  Larger states such as 
Pennsylvania and Virginia wanted proportional representation in both houses, while 
delegates from Delaware and Connecticut proposed proportional in the lower house and 
equal representation in the upper.  Most large state delegates, including Madison, had 
little interest in compromising.  Larger states even pushed for what now seem as rather 
radical ideas, such as the lower house selecting members of the upper house, and 
senators being selected without regard to state boundaries.  When John Dickinson of 
Delaware advocated for state legislators to select senators, Madison opposed on the 
grounds this would mean every state had representation in the Senate, and that a 
proportional upper house would be much too large.  To Madison the idea of state 
legislatures choosing senators interposed the state governments between the people 
and the national government.  He wanted the federal government to be independent of 
the states, and he feared that too much influence by state legislatures might 
compromise the sovereignty of the nascent government.  Several other ideas were 
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debated in the interim, including having each state start with a minimum of one senator, 
with numbers rising as populations got larger.25   
 Notes from the Constitutional Convention by William Jackson, the official 
secretary, follow along much the same narrative as Madison’s, though without some of 
the personal invective Madison displayed to the idea of equal representation of the 
states and senator selection by state legislatures.  Jackson discusses motions by John 
Lansing of New York and William Johnson of Connecticut.  Lansing pushed for the 
federal principle of equality in representation.  Johnson stated that state governments 
needed representation so that they would not be overruled and that since the lower 
house was chosen by the American people, the states must have a voice in the upper 
house.26    
 Madison’s writings show that by the end of the convention Gouverneur Morris 
“moved to render forever impossible the inequality of the States under the Constitution 
of the United States,” and “that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its 
equal suffrage in the Senate.” Morris, a delegate from a large state, helped to ensure 
that all of the states were on board with the equal and corporate representation of the 
states.27 Though Madison was adamant that state legislatures should not have a say as 
to who represented a state in either house of Congress, when the issue was presented 
to the entire convention the ten states that had delegates present unanimously voted to 
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allow state legislators to select senators, though by the end of the convention Madison 
wrote: 28 
In republican government, the legislative authority, necessarily  
predominates.  The remedy for this inconvenience is, to divide the  
legislature into different branches; and to render them by different modes  
of election, and different principles of action, as little connected with each  
other, as the nature of their common functions and their common  
dependencies on the society, will admit.29  
 
 The result of the Constitutional Convention was that the voters in each state 
would play an indirect role through their selection of state legislative representatives. As 
a result, Senators were to act as direct agents of the state legislatures, not specifically 
the citizens of a state.  The idea was to secure the interests of states at the national 
government level.  As George Mason stated during the debates, “the state legislatures 
also ought to have some means of defending themselves against encroachments of the 
national government.”30    
 By the time of the Constitutional Convention most states had already established 
bicameral legislatures, so the concept of an upper house was recognized and even 
generally accepted as the norm throughout the former colonies.  The exceptions to this 
rule were Pennsylvania and Georgia, though Georgia had discussed the idea of forming 
an upper house between the end of the American Revolution and the signing of the 
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Constitution on several different occasions.  The shortcomings of the unicameral style of 
legislature were well known, even in the states that practiced it, so little real debate over 
the Senate’s existence got in the way of the its establishment.  The idea of the 
bicameral legislature was seen as a check on an all too powerful Parliament.  In 
conjunction with regular elections that would ensure poor office holders would move 
on,31 splitting legislative authority would also protect against dominance by one 
faction.32  
 James Madison, in Federalist 45, indicated that state governments should be 
regarded as constituent parts of the federal government, and even more importantly, 
Madison noted that states could very well operate without the national government, 
while the opposite argument of a successful national government without the individual 
states was not seen to be true.  Madison, in a dramatic change of view from the early 
parts of the Constitutional Convention, went on to make the point that the choice of 
senator was wholly in the prerogative of the state legislature, “absolutely and 
exclusively,” forcing one half of one branch of government to be dependent on the 
individual states.33 Information regarding this extreme change in Madison’s thought 
process could not be found but after the Convention had ended Madison, Hamilton, and 
Jay wrote a series of articles that became known as The Federalist Papers, 
encouraging the adoption of the Constitution by the state legislatures.  It is quite 
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possible that Madison put his interest in equal representation on the side in order to 
ensure the documents passage.  In Federalist 63 Madison goes on to enforce the idea 
of a bicameral legislature by stating that: 
The people will never willfully betray their own interests; but they may possibly be 
betrayed by the representatives of the people; and the danger will be evidently 
greater where the whole legislative trust is lodged in the hands of one body of 
men, than where the concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is required in 
every public act.34  
 
  The fundamental issues to arise in the debate and development of the United 
States Senate came down to what specific powers, privileges, and authorities it would 
have, and representation numbers.  Larger states typically wanted the representation to 
be population based, while smaller states generally wanted a more level, if not fully 
equal, body.  Interestingly, the idea of larger and smaller states had less to do with the 
current state populations than it had to do with the potential expansion the states saw.  
A state with a smaller population like North Carolina had delegates that were more apt 
to support proportional representation, as they realized that they had the proverbial 
“room to grow,” while states such as Massachusetts, with an already relatively large 
population, leaned a bit more towards equal representation since they logically thought 
that they might be at the end of their growth.  Antifederalists in the larger states argued 
that equal representation was unnecessarily oppressive towards their populations.  
Federalists would argue that without equality the small states would be overpowered by 
the larger states and that the body would simply be a different version of the House of 
Representatives.35    
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 At the Constitutional Convention Charles Pinckney of South Carolina argued that 
the composition of the Senate as proposed would express the sovereignty of the states.  
James Madison defended this thought process with justifications written in the 
Federalist 62:  
 …a people thoroughly incorporated into one nation every district ought 
 to have a proportional share in the government and that among  
 independent and sovereign States, bound together by a simple league,  
 the parties, however unequal in size ought to have an equal share in the 
 common councils… the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the 
 principles of proportional and equal representation.36  
 
 The idea of representation for the individual states was tied to the “Connecticut 
Compromise” negotiations that took place during the Constitutional Convention.  The 
Connecticut Compromise, as it eventually became known, provided Congress with the 
bicameral legislature it still enjoys.  This was done, in part, to avoid the seemingly 
unstable and unbalanced conditions many colonial legislatures had with their royal 
governors.37 By the time the Constitutional Convention started most states had already 
established some version of a two chamber legislature, the exceptions being 
Pennsylvania and Georgia, and little real debate was held as to the legitimacy of the 
idea.38   
 The House of Representatives was established to be a popularly elected body.  
The belief was that representatives chosen directly by the people was necessary for a 
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free government to function properly.39  It was to be responsive to public opinion, could 
potentially be innovative in its actions, and was nominally designed to quickly and 
efficiently legislate.  The Senate was basically designed to be to opposite of this.40  As 
representatives of the specific state legislatures, the Senate would place a vital check 
on the popularly elected branch and allow the many states to look beyond the next 
election cycle. 41  Representation at the state level was intended to ensure the federal 
nature of the American governmental system, institutionalizing a place for the states in 
the national government.42 
 As part of the Connecticut Compromise, Luther Martin argued that each state 
should have equal instead of proportional representation in at least one of the legislative 
houses, since states were looked at as sovereign nations and independent in almost all 
aspects of how they governed themselves.43 The states had equal representation under 
the Articles of Confederation, and had maintained the idea of equal votes at the 
Constitutional Convention, and it seemed obvious to many, especially from the smaller 
states, that the Senate should be structured in a way as to keep that ideal.  Smaller 
states did not want to give up the power that they already had accrued as equals on the 
battlefield now that the political realities were becoming apparent.44   
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 Some options discussed at the Constitutional Convention dealing with the 
establishment of the Senate and its selection process reduce down to three overarching 
ideas: selection by state legislatures, the direct election of senators in large, multistate 
districts, and selection by the House of Representatives from a list that individual state 
legislatures developed.  An idea that was discussed initially, but eventually discarded, 
was apportioning Senate positions proportionally based on state population, similar to 
the House.  It was quickly realized that this would lead to too big of a Senate, one that 
would make debate difficult at best, as well as remove the advantages equal 
representation would give the smaller states.45  
 Even into the more current era the idea of equality of representation is still seen 
by many as needed in order to ensure each state has a place on the political stage.  
Lee and Oppenheimer cited Senator John Melcher (D-MT), in the 1987 version of the 
Congressional Record, where Melcher praised the Great Compromise, saying “On 
behalf of Montana and all States like it, with small populations, we thank those 
Connecticut Yankees for their foresight and their genius; their compromise permitted 
great States such as Montana and all the rest of the West, so diverse in a land of plains, 
mountains and rivers, so rich in agriculture and minerals and forests but limited in 
population, to become partners with other states on a footing of equality in the 
Senate.”46 
 Contrary to its name, the Connecticut, or, Great Compromise was not really a 
compromise, at least in the traditional sense of the word.  The only thing of significance 
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that the small states gave up in order to get the equal Senate that they wanted was to 
allow the House of Representatives to have origination rights to all spending bills, with 
the Senate only having advisory and veto powers.  Threats of joining in league with 
foreign entities or splitting into individual nation states also put extreme pressure on the 
members of the Convention.  This put enough pressure on the body as to ensure the 
ultimate decision of having equal representation for each of the member states and 
caused the large state block to collapse.47 
 In Federalist 62, James Madison wrote that having state legislatures appoint 
senators and this idea had a “double advantage” over a popular election for a senator.  
If done correctly it would lead to an educated decision process by professional 
legislatures choosing a United States senator and giving state governments an agency 
to secure an authoritative link between states and the national government.  The 
Senate, being the direct representative of the states, would also allow smaller states to 
have a form of check on larger states.  If a block of more populous states would attempt 
to push legislation through the House of Representatives, the majority of states would 
still be able to challenge them through actions in the Senate.  States could also ensure 
effective senators would be able to be returned to their position even if popular opinion 
may seem against such an act.48 
 Referring again to Federalist 62, section II, James Madison, as Publius, seems to 
concur with Martin, acknowledging the advantage of Senate appointments as securing 
the authority of the States in the Federal system and allowing the senator to act as “a 
                                                          
 47 Frances E. Lee and Bruce Oppenheimer. Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal 
Representation.  Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1999. p. 39. 
 48 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison. The Federalist Papers. New York: Fall River Press. 
2017. p. 283-5. 
22 
 
convenient link between the two systems,”49 or, the state and national governments.  
John Adams, at the time of the Constitutional Convention, saw the House of 
Representatives and the Senate as a “diplomatic assembly” and not a true legislature.  
He thought that the House of Representatives should be a miniature version of the 
society as a whole, with every section of the country embodied proportionally in its halls.  
The Senate existed to aggressively defend the rights of the states and were to act as 
representatives of their respective legislatures.50  
 From the initial debates during the Constitutional Convention there were myriad 
deliberations as to the establishment and organization of the United States Senate.  
Edmund Randolph’s Virginia Plan called for the appointment of the upper chamber, 
though with a twist on the idea of state legislatures making the decision: he initially 
called for the House of Representatives to select the upper based on nominations by 
state legislatures.51  The standing committee that was charged with discussing and 
resolving issues with the Virginia Plan initially went for proportionally weighted senators 
having a seven year term and that the position would be selected at the discretion each 
individual state legislature.52 
 On June 7, 1787 the “small” states won the idea that the individual state 
legislatures should choose the senators that would represent them at the national level.  
The primary leaders of this argument were John Dickenson of Delaware, William 
                                                          
 49 John P. Kaminski and Richard Leffler.  Federalists and Antifederalists: The Debate Over the Ratification 
of the Constitution.  Madison, Wisconsin: Madison House, 1989. p. 79. 
 50 Julian E. Zelizer.  The American Congress: The Building of Democracy. New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company.  2004.  p. 6- 7. 
 51 Julian E. Zelizer.  The American Congress: The Building of Democracy. New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Company.  2004.  p. 13. 
 52 Clinton Rossiter.  1787: The Grand Convention.  New York: Collier-Macmillan Limited. 1966.  p. 174.   
23 
 
Paterson of New Jersey, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, and Roger Sherman, also of 
Connecticut.  They had initially argued for equal representation of the states, with an 
identical number of senators from each, something large states such as Virginia and 
New York were against, favoring the same proportional representation seen in the 
House of Representatives.  James Wilson of Pennsylvania wanted Senate 
representation to be based on population, but politicked aggressively to ensure senators 
were chosen by the individual state legislatures.53  The small states did not win the 
dispute at that time as to representation, but did win the general idea that the states 
“would be represented as equal corporate entities.”54  
 Debate ensued on and off throughout the summer of 1787 as to the ultimate 
structure of the Senate.  Roger Sherman felt that the Senate should be chosen by the 
various state level legislatures in order to counter the popular election of U.S. 
Representatives.  In what could be termed a rather reprehensible comment in the 
modern political scene, Sherman stated: “The people should have as little to do as may 
be about the government.  They lack information and are constantly liable to be 
misled.”55 Delegates to the Constitutional Convention disagreed on many details of how 
the federal government should be designed, and many arguments about the Senate 
itself, but there was a general consensus that the Senate should follow a specific ideal:   
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• It should be smaller in size than the House of Representatives.  This idea is 
related to the fact that the institution was set up to encourage debates and have 
a more collegial atmosphere.  A relatively small size would allow senators to 
know each other on a more personal level, hopefully allowing for thorough, yet 
respectful, discussions on governance.   
• The Senate should be more distinguished than the lower house of the legislature.  
Having more experienced politicians, already respected by state level peers, 
would allow for an almost automatic comradery with both peers, and with high 
level government official, both domestic and international.   
• It was also important that the Senate be less reactionary than the House of 
Representatives.  Since terms were assumed to be long, and appointments were 
dependent on the class of professionals that were supposed to represent the 
people at the state level, it was assumed that the Senate would only react and 
legislate after thoroughly deliberating a subject.56 
 The United States Senate initially was modeled on the rather recently vacated 
colonial governors’ executive councils that were common during the pre-Revolutionary 
period.  The Senate was expected to work as a whole and support the established 
regime, of the state legislatures in this case, but were also highly independent in the 
range and scope of what they would attempt to accomplish.  They were to conduct free 
and unlimited debate, with the voice of the minority always in a position to slow, if not 
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outright cease discussion and action.  They were also to act as a revisory body on 
initiatives developed in the House of Representatives.57   
 None of the delegates at the Convention thought the position of senator should 
be hereditary, though an idea of it imitating an aristocratic approach was seen by a 
sizable segment as potentially beneficial for proper international dealings with European 
entities more used to the supposed stability that a permanent ruling class gave.  Against 
this idea were the Antifederalists, who argued that long terms of six years and no 
mandatory rotation in office seemed too patrician and an abhorrence to the reason for 
separating from Great Britain in the first place.  They also argued about some of the 
base structural ideas being discussed deep into the Convention.  The idea of senators 
working so close with the President on various governmental appointments and with 
international treaties seemed on its face to violate the sacrosanct idea of separation of 
powers. The same disagreement arose with having the Vice President serve as the 
president of the Senate and be used to vote in the legislative process.58  “The 
Antifederalists were not merely willing to suffer a Senate- they were glad to see it, 
because it was a federal feature.”59  Some delegates and those in the public did 
complain about the idea of senators being selected by state legislatures, particularly 
“Cincinnatus,” the pseudonym for Arthur Lee of Virginia, but the common opinion was 
generally for appointment of these positions in order to ensure the individual States had 
a seat at the national table.   
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 At the Constitutional Convention there was no real push for popular elections 
other than some low key complaining that was quickly overcome by larger events.  
Some primary complaints came from length of terms, and initially not even about the 
aforementioned six or seven years, as there was a sizable contingent of Antifederalists 
who thought all elections should be held on an annual basis.  To a lesser extent there 
were criticisms of no mandated rotation of office, as it was presumed by many of the era 
that political careers would be short, and to the specific powers assigned to it that 
combined aspects of the legislative and executive branches.60 
 Alexander Hamilton went as far as to say that the position should be lifelong 
selection, but had no real support on this.  Edmund Randolph thought a seven year 
appointment was desirable in order to ensure the Senate could properly counterbalance 
the House.  James Madison agreed to longer terms as it would appear more 
respectable to foreign entities if the members were more experienced and longer 
serving.  Madison saw frequent elections as extremely important for the lower house, 
but as blatantly problematic for the upper chamber.  The responsiveness of the House 
is good to the general overall functioning of government, but in the Senate too much 
would be detrimental to minority rights as the majority will always assert their naked 
interests, something the long terms and demanding procedures for moving and passing 
legislation in the Senate were supposed to discourage.61 
 Fear of a senator gaining too much power or serving for too long a period of time 
was argued against by most delegates since each position was the responsibility of the 
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respective state legislature, guaranteeing in theory that they would be restrained.  The 
Convention eventually agreed to the current six year term and a two year election 
cycle.62   
 At the Convention the vote for legislative selection was 9-2, with two large states 
opposing, Pennsylvania and Virginia.63 Lee and Oppenheimer have researched and 
found that from the First Congress in 1789 to the late 1800s, when early progressive 
parties and politicians started pushing for the direct election of United States senators, 
there was no evidence that senators representing a minority of the population tended to 
vote together against senators representing a majority.64  Studying roll-call voting results 
have shown that party, ideology, cue taking, presidential leadership, and constituency 
interests are much more important factors.  After the Constitutional Convention no major 
political issue has divided small states from large states at any point in United States 
history.65   
  The Senate emerged from the founding era as a secretive, contentious, and at 
times, transient body.  The transient quality of the Senate, and much government at all 
levels of the young nation, was tempered after the first several election cycles as the 
newly formed federal and state governments filled in positions and people seemed to 
find comfortable roles.  The institution steadily evolved into a legislative body with 
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substantial influence upon Washington politics and national policy making.66 The 
individual senator was responsible for pleasing the legislators from their home state, but 
they were expected to vote independently of any direct pressures or mandates from 
their appointers.  Due to the structural design of the Senate that was quickly established 
during the First Congress, senators were not obligated to listen to state legislatures on 
individual votes.  Six year terms and pay from the Federal government helped to 
insulate them to direct pressure.67 The general objection to the Senate was 
counterbalanced by the Senate being responsible to the state legislatures.68   
 Alexander Hamilton stated in a six hour long speech on the Convention floor that 
the people will regulate the national representatives directly through voting, in the form 
of the House of Representatives, or by electing or failing to reelect state legislators that 
make good or poor decisions on United States senators.  He thought that states should 
be able to instruct their senators, but saw them as pretty much independent actors.69  
The Senate was expected to play its role at arm’s length from the people, and longer 
terms of office and selection by legislatures, fellow professional politicians, would 
insulate them from the ebb and flow of public opinion.  This also helped to limit the 
campaigning and the related fundraising that has become a stain on modern politics.70 
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 Early in the history of the United States Senate, specifically the first three 
Congresses ending in 1795, turnover of senators was quite large.  Some seats were 
open to election as often as House seats with replacements needed for senators that 
resigned once positions in state government opened up to them.  With newly developing 
political alliances, state level positions opening, and the private sector beckoning, many 
politicians chose a life closer to home than the early United States capitals of New York 
City or Philadelphia.  A senator leaving office after one term, or even before its 
completion continued unabated once the prospect of life in a slowly developing 
backwater of what is now Washington D.C. limped into view.71 
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CHAPTER 2. CONCERNS WITH THE SENATE 
Potential Evidence of Corruption in the pre-Progressive Era United States Senate 
 Even though there was much evidence of corrupt practices in the selection of 
United States senators in late 19th century America, this corruption was by no means 
either across the board or exclusive to the United States Senate and in the end factored 
very little into the actual passage of the Seventeenth Amendment.  There is no doubt 
that there has been corruption and malfeasance witnessed in the storied history of the 
United States Senate.  From almost the nation’s beginning it was evident that as an 
institution developed by man, it was also potentially attractive to those who had in mind 
bad intentions.  Just a decade after the ratification of the United States Constitution the 
United States Congress had to decide on the fate of one of its members, accused of 
high crimes against the nascent country.   
 William Blount of North Carolina/Tennessee, who served in the North Carolina 
militia during the American Revolution, was elected to six terms in the North Carolina 
legislature, represented his state in Congress under the Articles of Confederation, and 
was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention.  After losing the election for United 
States senator he secured an appointment as territorial governor of the lands west of 
the Alleghenies ceded to the United States by Great Britain and awarded to North 
Carolina. In 1796, when this territory became the state of Tennessee, Blount was 
elected one of its first two senators.  Almost immediately upon entering office, and 
already in financial difficulties arising from his land speculations in western lands, Blount 
became involved in a plan whose aim was to organize an armed force of frontiersmen 
and Native Americans, and with the help of the British fleet, to eject the Spanish from 
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Florida and Louisiana.  The final goal was to transfer control to Great Britain and secure 
the financial viability of his landholdings.  When the plot came to the attention of the 
United States government, Blount was expelled from the Senate, and impeachment 
proceedings were started.  He was impeached from the Senate but never officially 
removed from office as it became apparent he was going to willingly leave the Senate.  
Blount returned to Tennessee, where there was actually a base of support for ridding 
the Spanish from the Mississippi River basin, keeping his reputation intact.  He was 
elected in 1798 to the Tennessee State Senate and even served as speaker until his 
death in 1800.1 
 One needs to take into account that, as the number of these government officials 
has grown over the last two centuries, the relative frequency of impeachment 
proceedings has declined across the board. In the first three federal impeachments, 
William Blount in 1797–99, Federal District Judge John Pickering in 1803–04, and 
Supreme Court Associate Justice Samuel Chase in 1804–05, were tied to one of the 
most volatile and malicious eras in American political history.  This fact may well make 
this quick succession of impeachments atypical events as to both occurrence and 
political partisanship.2 
 The extremeness and novelty of Blount’s impeachment may have influenced 
observers, all the way to modern Constitutional scholars.  It is commonly believed that 
the senator’s removal from office was a singular event, and barred the impeachments of 
                                                          
 1 Mark Grossman (edited). "William Blount (1749-1800)." The Encyclopedia of The Continental Congresses.  
2015. 
https://proxy.buffalostate.edu:2443/login?url=https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/greycc/william_
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 2 Buckner F. Melton. Let Me Be Blunt: In Blount, the Senate Never Said that Senators Aren't Impeachable. 
Quinnipiac Law Review, Vol. 33, 2014. October 14, 2014. p. 42. 
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senators.  It is a fact that since Blount, no senator has ever again been impeached, but 
this circumstance cannot be viewed in isolation though. Since 1789 there have literally 
been thousands of members of higher levels of the United States government that 
served in positions where it was theoretically possible to pursue impeachment should 
the need arise.  More than three thousand people have served in a judicial capacity on 
various Article III courts.  An additional five hundred or more individuals have served in 
the Presidency, the Vice Presidency, and the Cabinet, along with other lower level 
executive positions that are conceivably subject to policing by removal from office.  
Nearly two thousand others have served in the Senate. Given such numbers of 
potentially impeachable individuals, and accepting in the course of an argument that 
senators are impeachable, the handful of actual impeachments throughout the history of 
the entire United States government is a small sample for determining such trends.3 
 Contrary to the modern opinion that senators in the 19th century could blatantly 
get away with various bad acts with little to no repercussion, as early as 1807 Senator 
John Smith of Ohio, a close ally to then deposed Vice President Aaron Burr, was tried 
by the Senate for treason and came within one vote of being removed.  Even though his 
seat in the Senate was safe for him to keep for the duration of his term, Smith’s own 
state legislature was less than impressed by his actions and demanded his resignation 
from the United States Senate.4 An additional example of the Senate policing its own, or 
other form of punishment being meted out, is tied to the American Civil War and the 
secession of states from the Union.  Almost the entire Southern contingent of 
                                                          
 3 Buckner F. Melton. Let Me Be Blunt: In Blount, the Senate Never Said that Senators Aren't Impeachable. 
Quinnipiac Law Review, Vol. 33, 2014. October 14, 2014. p. 42. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2509665 
 4 Marshall Smelser.  The Democratic Republic. Prospect Height, Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc. 1968. p. 123. 
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representatives and senators left the service of the Federal government and transferred 
en masse, minus Andrew Johnson, to the newly established Confederacy.5 
 Traditionally, academics and historians have documented, and the general 
American population have learned in school, of the presumed massive amounts of 
corruption and dishonesty in late 19th and early 20th Century United States Senate 
politics.  Corrupt actions were evident in many state legislatures from the time of 
President Andrew Jackson in the late 1820s and 1830s, and there are examples of less 
than ethical actions even before this time.   
 Though there might be disagreement as to the exact timing of the direct election 
movement, it clearly was in motion by the mid-1870s.  Between 1893 and 1912, the 
year before the Seventeenth Amendment was ratified, members of Congress, in every 
single session, presented legislation to change how senators gained office. The state 
legislatures, in conjunction with the House of Representatives, started the push for a 
constitutional amendment that would establish the process at the national level.  Many 
senators protested this idea and at some points even attempted to remove Congress’s 
ability to change in any way the Election Clause of Article 1. Of their own accord many 
states started to implement primary elections for senators, where voters could decide 
the candidate of their choice, and the party who won the majority of legislative seats 
would then choose the candidate their supporters had decided on.  The popularity, or 
lack thereof, became much more important to the state level elections.  This would 
                                                          
 5 William Smith White. Citadel: The Story of the United States Senate. New York: Harper and Brothers, 
Publishers, 1956. p. 125. 
34 
 
eventually force state governments to be a prime mover on the direct election process, 
in order to remove their names from the process all together.6 
 To reinforce that troubles with the United States Senate were not specifically tied 
just to the Senate, one has to look at the actual criminal cases brought against 
members of the federal government during and before the era.  Criminal activity among 
United States representatives and senators, along with members of the executive and 
judicial branches, were typically not prosecuted in the state or federal court systems 
unless extreme crimes were committed, and these crimes were typically of a personal 
felonious nature, and not directly related to government activities.  Up to the end of the 
Progressive Era, softly dated for this thesis as 1920 and the ratification of the 
Nineteenth Amendment, only nine federal government officials were charged with 
impeachable offenses, and only three were actually fully impeached and removed from 
office, all three being either district judges or other federal level magistrates.7  Judges 
and government prosecutors showed an “inability or unwillingness to put a stop to the 
wrongdoing of very rich men.”8   
United States Senate Expulsion and Censure Cases, 1797 to 2018 
 Censures, expulsions, and impeachments are exceedingly rare in the Senate. In 
the course of the United States Senate’s history, expulsion has been threatened (as 
evidenced by actual proceedings, not just the politicizing and editorializing of base 
                                                          
 6 David Schleicher. “The Seventeenth Amendment: Federalism in an Age of National Political Parties.” 
Hastings Law Journal. Hastings College of Law. May 2014. p. 1055-6. 
 7 United States History. “Impeachment.” http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h231.html. http://www.u-s-
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 8 Elizabeth Sanders. Ohio State Law Journal. “Reflections on Progressive Constitutionalism: Theory, 
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ideological issues) or actually used only in cases of treason and felony convictions. Of 
the twenty-three cases in which senators were actually voted on and in point of fact 
expelled, all involved charges of treason or disloyalty, and all but one dealt with 
senators who sided with the Confederacy in the Civil War.  Ten other senators, although 
not expelled, have been the subject of senatorial expulsion proceedings: four for 
suspected treason or disloyalty; five for allegedly accepting bribes or receiving 
compensation for services rendered before a department of the Government. One was 
tried for his alleged membership in a "religious hierarchy that countenanced and 
encouraged polygamy and united church and state contrary to the spirit of the 
constitution ...." The most recent senators to face the threat of expulsion were Senator 
Harrison Williams of New Jersey and Senator Robert Packwood of Oregon. The 
outcomes in their cases are representative of the modern trend.  Like several senators 
before them, both men resigned their seats only after several months of incessant 
media scrutiny and the obviousness of no imaginable recovery from the cases against 
them.9 
 On July 10th, 1861 a total of ten senators were expelled because they “failed to 
appear in their seats in the Senate and to aid the Government in this important crisis… 
engaged in said conspiracy for the destruction of the Union.”  Senator Breckenridge of 
Kentucky was expelled that December.10 More senators would be removed in 1862. 
                                                          
 9 Timothy Zick. The Consent of the Governed: Recall of United States Senators.  Dickinson Law Review. 
Volume 103, Issue 3. Published 22 March 1999. p. 567. 
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 10 Clarke F. Hunn. “Precedents For Purifying Congress.” The Advocate of Peace (1894-1920), vol. 79, no. 
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 To properly understand pre-Seventeenth Amendment and the post-Seventeenth 
Amendment corruption issues in the United States Senate, it is important to be able to 
compare impeachments, expulsions, and censures both before and after the passage of 
the amendment.  It is necessary to also make obvious that a large number of expulsions 
happened in the early days of the American Civil War, when a large proportion of the 
Southern contingent of senators were expelled because they chose to support the 
secession of their home states and turn their backs on the United States government.  
The following list is inclusive of all impeachment, expulsion, and censure proceedings, 
successful or not, that have taken part in United States Senate history, with annotations 
describing the issues at hand as they are applicable.  This information comes directly 
from the United States Senate website and is reinforced by research by Anne M. Butler 
and Wendy Wolff of the Government Accounting Office.11 
Overall Expulsions from the United States Senate 
 Article I, Section 5, of the United States Constitution provides that "Each House 
of Congress may determine the Rules of its proceedings, punish its members for 
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member."  Since 
1789, the Senate has expelled only twenty-three of its entire membership. Of that 
number, fourteen were accused of supporting the Confederacy during the American 
Civil War. In several other cases, to be discussed on the following pages, the Senate 
considered expulsion proceedings but either found the member not guilty or failed to act 
before the senator left office. In those cases, corruption was the principal reason of 
                                                          
 11 Anne M. Butler and Wendy Wolff. United States Senate Election, Expulsion and Censure Cases, 1793-
1990. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995. 
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complaint.  Over the course of the Senate's history, only four members have been 
convicted of crimes. Joseph R. Burton (1905), John Hipple Mitchell (1905), Truman H. 
Newberry (1920), and Harrison Williams (1981). Newberry's conviction was later 
overturned. Mitchell died before a vote on his expulsion proceedings could officially take 
place so is not in the official numbers of attempted expulsions or censures.  Burton, 
Newberry, and Williams resigned before the Senate could act on their expulsion.  The 
men may have never officially been expelled from the Senate, but the resignations must 
be seen as some combination of either tacit admission of guilt or an overwhelming 
obstacle that was no longer worth fighting for. 
 Unless otherwise noted, the following expulsions and censures, along with 
subsidiary information, listed through the rest of the chapter come directly from the 
History section of the United States Senate website.12 
Pre-Seventeenth Amendment Expulsions 
• In 1797, William Blount of Tennessee was expelled and impeached.  
As previously presented his charges were anti-Spanish conspiracy and treason. 
• In 1808, John Smith of Ohio was tried but not expelled for disloyalty and treason. 
Smith’s expulsion failed 19 to 10, under the required two-thirds majority. At the 
request of the Ohio legislature, Smith resigned two weeks after the vote.  
 The following cohort were expelled from the United States Senate in a short time 
span from early 1861 through early 1862 because they “failed to appear in their 
                                                          
 12 United States Senate. “Expulsion and Censure.” https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/ 
common/briefing/Expulsion_Censure.htm 
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seats in the Senate and to aid the Government in this important crisis… engaged in 
said conspiracy for the destruction of the Union.”  Simply, they left for the 
Confederacy. 
• In 1861, James M. Mason of Virginia was expelled for supporting the 
Confederate rebellion. 
• In 1861, Robert M.T. Hunter of Virginia was expelled for supporting the 
Confederate rebellion. 
• In 1861, Thomas L. Clingman of North Carolina was expelled for supporting the 
Confederate rebellion. 
• In 1861, Thomas Bragg of North Carolina was expelled for supporting the 
Confederate rebellion. 
• In 1861, James Chesnut, Jr. of South Carolina was expelled for supporting the 
Confederate rebellion. 
• In 1861, Alfred O.P. Nicholson of Tennessee was expelled for supporting the 
Confederate rebellion. 
• In 1861, William K. Sebastian of Arkansas was expelled for supporting the 
Confederate rebellion.   
On March 3, 1877, the Senate reversed its decision to expel Sebastian. 
Sebastian had died in 1865, so his children were paid an amount equal to his 
Senate salary between the time of his expulsion and the date of his death. 
• In 1861, Charles B. Mitchel of Arkansas was expelled for supporting the 
Confederate rebellion. 
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• In 1861, John Hemphill of Texas was expelled for supporting the Confederate 
rebellion. 
• In 1861, Louis T. Wigfall of Texas was expelled for supporting the Confederate 
rebellion.  
In March 1861, the Senate took no action on an initial resolution expelling Wigfall 
because he represented a state that had seceded from the Union, but he had not 
officially claimed allegiance to the Confederacy. Three months later, on July 10, 
1861, he was expelled for supporting the Confederacy. 
• In 1861, John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky was expelled for supporting the 
Confederate rebellion. 
• In 1862, Lazarus W. Powell of Kentucky was tried, but not expelled for supporting 
the Confederate rebellion. 
• In 1862, Trusten Polk of Kentucky was expelled for supporting the Confederate 
rebellion. 
• In 1862, Lazarus W. Powell of Kentucky was tried, but not expelled for supporting 
the Confederate rebellion 
• In 1862, Waldo P. Johnson of Missouri was expelled for supporting the 
Confederate rebellion. 
• In 1862, Jesse D. Bright of Indiana was expelled for supporting the Confederate 
rebellion. 
Bright was the only senator from a state that remained in the Union to be 
expelled for support of the Confederacy.  He had written a letter to Confederate 
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President Jefferson Davis in an attempt to get the Confederacy to purchase a 
new style of firearms from one of his constituents.13  
Senator Bright was the last senator to be expelled under the auspices of support of the 
Confederate rebellion. 
• In 1862, James F. Simmons of Rhode Island was charged with corruption.  
On July 14, 1862, the Judiciary Committee reported that the charges against 
Simmons were essentially correct. The Senate adjourned three days later, and 
Simmons resigned on September 5 before the Senate could take action. 
• In 1873, James W. Patterson of New Hampshire was charged with corruption.  
A Senate select committee recommended expulsion on February 27th. On March 
1st, a Republican caucus decided that there was insufficient time remaining in the 
session to deliberate the matter. Patterson's term expired March 3rd, and no 
further action was taken. 
• In 1893, William N. Roach of North Dakota was charged with embezzlement.  He 
was not expelled. 
After extensive deliberation, the Senate took no action, assuming that it lacked 
jurisdiction over members' behavior before their election to the Senate. The 
alleged embezzlement had occurred 13 years earlier and did not have anything 
to do with Roach’s service in the United States Senate. 
• In 1906, Joseph R. Burton of Kansas was charged with corruption.  He was 
expelled, but fought the conviction of receiving compensation for intervening with 
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a federal agency. When the Supreme Court upheld his conviction, he resigned 
rather than face expulsion. 
• In 1907, Reed Smoot of Utah was charged with Mormonism.  He was not 
expelled.  After an investigation spanning two years, the Committee on Privileges 
and Elections reported that Smoot was not entitled to his seat because he was a 
leader in a religion that advocated polygamy and a union of church and state, 
contrary to the U.S. Constitution. By a vote of 27 to 43, however, the Senate 
refused to expel him, finding that he satisfied the constitutional requirements for 
serving as a senator. 
Post-Seventeenth Amendment Expulsions 
• In 1919, Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin was charged with disloyalty.  He was 
not expelled.  The Committee on Privileges and Elections recommended that the 
Senate take no action as a speech La Follette gave in 1917 speech opposing 
U.S. entry into World War I.  The Senate agreed 50 to 21 that the case had no 
merit. 
• In 1922, Truman H. Newbury of Michigan was charged with election fraud.   
On March 20, 1920, Newberry was convicted on charges of spending $3,750 to 
secure his Senate election. The United States Supreme Court overturned this 
decision on May 2nd, 1921 on the grounds that the United States Senate 
exceeded its powers in attempting to regulate primary elections. By a vote of 46 
to 41, the Senate declared Newberry to have been duly elected in 1918. On 
November 18, two days before the start of the 3rd session of the 67th Congress, 
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Newberry resigned as some Senate members resumed their efforts to unseat 
him. 
• In 1924, Burton Wheeler of Montana was charged with conflict of interest.  He 
was not expelled. 
Wheeler had been indicted for serving, while as a sitting senator, in causes in 
which the United States was a party. A Senate committee, however, found that 
his dealings related to litigation before state courts and that he received no 
compensation for any service before federal departments. The Senate 
exonerated him by a vote of 56 to 5. 
• In 1934, John H Overton of Louisiana was charged with election fraud, but the 
Senate took no action. 
The Committee on Privileges and Elections concluded that the charges and 
evidence were insufficient to warrant further consideration. 
• In 1934, Huey P. Long of Louisiana was charged with election fraud, but the 
Senate took no action. 
The Privileges and Elections Committee considered this case in conjunction with 
that against Senator Overton and reached the same conclusion. 
• In 1942, William Langer of North Dakota was charged with corruption, but was 
not expelled. 
Recommending that this case was properly one of exclusion, not expulsion, the 
Committee on Privileges and Elections declared Langer guilty of moral turpitude 
and voted, 13 to 2, to deny him his seat. The Senate disagreed, 52 to 30, arguing 
that the evidence was hearsay and inconclusive. Langer retained his seat. 
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• In 1982, Harrison A. Williams, Jr. of New Jersey was charged with corruption. 
The Committee on Ethics recommended that Williams be expelled because of his 
"ethically repugnant" conduct in the “Abscam scandal,” for which he was 
convicted of conspiracy, bribery, and conflict of interest.  On March 11th, 1982, 
prior to a Senate vote on his expulsion, Williams resigned. 
• In 1995, Robert W. Packwood of Oregon was charged with sexual misconduct 
and abuse of power. 
The Committee on Ethics recommended that Packwood be expelled for abuse of 
his power as a senator "by repeatedly committing sexual misconduct" and "by 
engaging in a deliberate ... plan to enhance his personal financial position" by 
seeking favors "from persons who had a particular interest in legislation or 
issues" that he could influence, as well as for seeking "to obstruct and impede 
the committee's inquiries by withholding, altering, and destroying relevant 
evidence." On September 7, 1995, the day after the committee issued its 
recommendation, Packwood announced his resignation without specifying an 
effective date. On September 8, he indicated that he would resign effective 
October 1, 1995. 
Overall Censures from the United States Senate 
 A less severe form of discipline used by the Senate against its members is 
censure.  This act is also occasionally referred to as a condemnation or a 
denouncement. A censure does not remove a senator from office. It is a formal 
statement of disapproval that can have a powerful psychological effect on a member 
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and their relationships in the Senate. Since 1789 the Senate has censured nine of its 
members.  Censures only take a simple majority in order to become effective. 
Pre-Seventeenth Amendment Censures  
• In 1811, Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts was charged with reading 
confidential documents in open Senate session before an injunction of secrecy 
was removed.  He was censured.  His selection bid the following year failed, but 
he was elected to the House of Representatives instead.  The result of the vote 
was 20-7. 
• In 1844, Benjamin Tappan of Ohio was charged with releasing a copy of 
President John Tyler's message to the Senate to the New York Evening Post.  
The message was in regard to the treaty of annexation between the United 
States and the Republic of Texas. He was censured and chose not to try to 
remain after his term expired.  The result of the vote was 38-7. 
• In 1902 Benjamin R. Tillman and John L. McLaurin, both of South Carolina, were 
charged with fighting in the Senate Chamber.  Each was censured and 
suspended, retroactively, for six days. This incident led to the adoption of Rule 
XIX governing the conduct of debate in the chamber. Tillman was selected for 
the Senate again.  McLaurin decided to leave at the expiration of his term. The 
result of the vote was 54-12; with 22 not voting. 
Post-Seventeenth Amendment Censures  
• In 1929 Hiram Bingham of Connecticut was charged with retaining Charles 
Eyanson as a Senate staff member.  Eyanson at the time was concurrently 
45 
 
employed by the Manufacturers Association of Connecticut. Eyanson had been 
hired to assist Bingham on specific tariff legislation. The issue broadened into the 
question of the government employment practices. Bingham was "Condemned" 
for conduct tending "to bring the Senate into dishonor and disrepute."  He was 
consequently defeated for reelection.  The result of the vote was 54-22; with 18 
not voting. 
• In 1954, Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin was charged with abuse and non-
cooperation with the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections during a 1952 
investigation of his conduct, along with abuse of the Select Committee to Study 
Censure.  He was "condemned" for his actions.  He died while still in office, but 
before he had faced reelection.  The result of the vote was 67-22. 
• In 1967, Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut was charged with the use of his office to 
convert campaign funds to his personal benefit and conduct unbecoming of a 
United States senator.  He was censured and consequently defeated for 
reelection.  The result of the vote was 92-5. 
• In 1979, Herman E. Talmadge of Georgia was charged with improper financial 
conduct, accepting reimbursements of $43,435.83 for official expenses not 
incurred, and improper reporting of campaign receipts and expenditures.  His 
conduct was "denounced" as reprehensible and tending to bring the Senate into 
dishonor and disrepute. He was defeated for reelection.  The result of the vote 
was 81-15. 
• In 1990, David F. Durenberger of Minnesota was charged with unethical conduct 
"in connection with his arrangement with Piranha Press, his failure to report 
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receipt of travel expenses in connection with his Piranha Press and Boston area 
appearances, his structuring of real estate transactions and receipt of Senate 
reimbursements in connection with his stays in his Minneapolis condominium, his 
pattern of prohibited communications respecting the condominium, his repeated 
acceptance of prohibited gifts of limousine service for personal purposes, and the 
conversion of a campaign contribution to his personal use."  Durenberger was 
"Denounced" for reprehensible conduct, bringing the Senate into dishonor and 
disrepute. He did not run for reelection.  The result of the vote was 96-0. 
 Of the twenty-seven pre-Seventeenth Amendment expulsions or censures 
attempted, a total of sixteen were tied directly to support for the Confederate cause in 
the American Civil War, and could reasonably be argued did not come under the more 
traditional political crimes of standard treason, election fraud, misuse of monies, and the 
like.  The eleven non-Civil War related expulsions and censures attempted took place 
from the ratification of the United States Constitution through the ratification of the 
Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, a period of 124 years, would show an action 
approximately once every 11.3 years.  If the American Civil War numbers are added in 
one would dramatically increase the frequency of this number to one event every 4.6 
years.  During the post-Seventeenth Amendment Era, from 1913 through 2018, a 
timeframe of 105 years, there have been a total of thirteen actions.  This puts the 
modern rate at one event every 8 years.  Not only does the post-Seventeenth 
Amendment Era show a more com pressed timeframe between expulsion and censure 
events, it also shows a greater propensity for those expelled or censured to have taken 
part in the very acts of unethical conduct that that the pre-1913 Senate was accused of.  
47 
 
 There has been a certain amount of corruption and other disreputable acts during 
the entire life of the Senate, with no era necessarily being either better or more 
unethical than the other.  It can be contended that the larger gaps in time between 
expulsion and censure events and a lower tendency of accused senators from 
remaining in office before 1913 show that state legislatures were better at choosing 
senators than the public at large.  The low bar of not being removed from office does 
not show if a senator was effective at their profession, but merely illustrates that there is 
a certain fallacy to the Progressive Era idea that corruption was tied to the selection 
process instead of human fallibility, something that elections have not totally solved 
either.  It can be argued that some of the incidents might be due to a professionalization 
of politicians in general.  No longer of the same mentality of short bouts of service that 
many of the Founders’ generation typically adhered to, by the late 19th century political 
power had become the realm of graft and corruption, or so it might seem.  Of the pre-
Seventeenth Amendment era senators threatened with expulsion and that eventually 
survived the process, separating those related to supporting the Confederacy, only two 
stayed in office past the term they were tried in, including Reed Smoot of Utah, who was 
accused of “Mormonism.”  Smoot’s marital and religious issues aside, this may have 
been of a social and legal misstep for many Americans in the early 20th century, but 
certainly was not the high crimes and misdemeanors that would necessitate removal 
from the United States Senate.  State legislatures may well have been able to better 
determine the needs of their states and be more willing to jettison senators who either 
brought ill-repute or ineffectiveness to the position.  Since the advent of the electoral 
process for senators in 1913, five of the eight senators accused of expulsion worthy 
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crimes were reelected to their positions and stayed in office to well after their trials.  This 
shows that senators no longer need to worry about the potential wrath of the state 
legislatures they used to represent, but instead are able to stay in office due to the 
support that they receive from the public at large. 
  
   
CHAPTER 3. WHY ACTION WAS DEEMED NECESSARY 
 The Material Reason Senatorial Selection Process Required Action 
  It is imperative to understand that most of the issues as to the selection of United 
States senators were centered on the inordinate amount of time some state legislatures 
argued about what appeared to be more national issues and how long the states took to 
choose senators.1 It will be shown on the following pages that frequent deadlocks over 
the choice of senator made the process look broken to the average American.  The 
highly inefficient process of selecting new senators was just as frustrating for state 
legislators as well, as minority parties (and sometimes factions within the majority) and 
interests would use quorum rules to force impasses.  From 1891 to 1905 there were 
forty-five occurrences in twenty states of a seat going unfilled for at least a short amount 
of time.  In fourteen cases the seat remained empty for an entire congressional session.  
Delaware had three instances of an unfilled senate seat for entire Congresses during 
this timeframe, with no senators seated at all from 1901 to 1903. This issue was the 
case in states across the entire country, particularly those with split representation in its 
legislative houses, or those with severe internal political fracturing.2  
 From the advent of the United States through the early portions of the 20th 
century, most state level legislative positions were not considered the fulltime 
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occupations that most citizens are familiar with today.  State level bodies were often 
plagued with relatively low pay and infrequent scheduling of meetings, and many states 
assembling once every two years, often times for only a few months, or even less if 
most significant legislative activities were complete.  Many of these assemblies were 
mandated to be done with all legislative work within a tight window of time, or potentially 
have all the laws that were passed become null and void.  Given the thanklessness of 
the position and the aforementioned other issues the turnover in these positions was 
naturally very high. This often led to a severe lack of consistency in selections, weak 
institutional knowledge and poor interpersonal familiarity, and a tendency for politicians 
to pursue aggressively their personal agendas with little worry about future sessions or 
people.  This often led to political deadlocks as to the selection of United States senator, 
which could not be properly filled until after the next legislative elections, and in some 
cases, even longer periods of time.3 
 The inefficient selection processes saw state legislatures tasked with filtering 
potential political talent down to the most capable (most times) or best connected 
(sometimes) and readily ensure only loyal nominations were chosen.  This was 
supposed to guarantee that the utmost important concerns of and benefits for the states 
were fully represented.  This gave the state level legislatures an added interest in 
national politics, since proper future representation of their state was entirely up to 
them.4  Through most of the 19th century state legislatures saw the importance of their 
selections as this model represented what had happened in the original role of state 
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delegates for the Constitutional Conventions and the Articles of Confederation 
Conventions, but by the early 20th century many state legislatures and activist groups 
such as Granges, early unionists, and other populists started looking at direct elections 
as the most logical choice, and started efforts of their own to effect constitutional 
change.5  This continued pressure from some state level legislatures was initially 
ignored by the United States Senate as a whole, but would soon come to bear in the 
massive forces applied by the Progressive Era body of law toward all levels of 
government. 
 As independent political parties grew in power and stature, arguments arose over 
how individual states would choose their United States senators.  Issues had often 
times arisen as legislative deadlocks resulted in seats being not properly filled, 
sometimes leaving a state without a senator for years at a time.  By the time the 
Seventeenth Amendment had passed many state legislatures had been limited by state 
governments through the use of civil service regulations limiting patronage jobs, 
referendum and initiative processes sharing powers with the people, and other 
substantial limitations.6  These legislators were not the full time politicians modern 
Americans are used to.  They often times congregated only for biennial legislative 
sessions, and state legislative representatives were often ill-trained to make important 
decisions as significant as United States senators.   
 A series of contested elections in the mid-19th century and a change in public 
opinion saw it becoming increasingly important for a new method of selecting senators 
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to be established, ensuring a more efficient transfer of power between different sessions 
of the United States Senate.  In particular, the disputed 1865 election of Senator John 
P. Stockton, of New Jersey, created the ground work for standardizing the 
selection/election of United States senators. Before the election the New Jersey 
legislature changed the rules defining a quorum, illegally selecting a senator that did not 
have proper legislative support.  The uproar in the New Jersey legislature was that 
Stockton had received only a plurality, rather than a majority, of the votes in the joint 
session. At the time of the election the joint session of legislature had voted, 41 to 40, to 
overturn the state level requirement that a senator had to have a majority of all the 
legislators in order to be properly chosen.  The vote instead permitted the election by 
plurality of those present. The opponents contended that such a change required a 
majority vote by each house and that a majority of the state assembly members had not 
voted for the resolution.  Stockton, who had initially been seated in the Senate, was 
removed in March of 1866.  The seat remained open until the 1868 election cycle when 
Stockton legitimately received the majority of legislative votes and was returned to 
office.7  
 The state level deadlocks that eventually led to the Seventeenth Amendment 
helped to undermine the deliberations of the United States Senate and limited its 
effectiveness in carrying out their constitutional duties.  It also degraded the public’s 
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trust in the institution, even though the majority of senate selections were accomplished 
without any significant issues.  A simple amending of the 1866 statute that removed 
Senator Stockton from office, either permitting a plurality of the vote or a run-off election 
could have virtually eliminated the impasses without having to resort to the 
constitutional amendment process.8    
 A second reason was the undermining of control by political machines.  Probably 
the most known about the late 19th century to modern American society, was that in 
many states political machines became extremely powerful after the American Civil War 
Era.  These political machines continued to increase in strength and reach well into the 
period that became known as the Gilded Age, from the end of the American Civil War to 
the first few years of the 20th century when populists started gaining power.  This was a 
time of wide income disparity and a laisse faire attitude by the federal government and 
industry.  The machines that ran the politics of the time could all but ensure specific 
political parties and other powerful entities would have the ultimate control over the 
United States Senate.  The Senate would then supposedly serve as “millionaires club,”9 
filled with men willing to make decisions beneficial to special interests in exchange for 
the promise of wealth and power.  These senators were perceived as serving the 
interests of a few private people and groups,10 while putting the interests of their 
individual states and its citizens in a secondary position, treated almost as afterthoughts 
and even as inconveniences.  
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 Woodrow Wilson had called the Gilded Age, particularly during the Ulysses S. 
Grant administration, a time of “Congressional Government,” with the legislative branch 
superior to the executive.  Congress pushed legislation that seemed to benefit a precise 
group of constituents and was soon seen as the home of corruption.  The use of 
“spoils,” and lobbyists with open purses could easily give the impression that the Senate 
was essentially a corrupt institution.  Countering this argument, Margaret Thompson has 
contended that this lobbying was a necessary and possibly even a beneficial force in 
the time after the end of the American Civil War.  She wrote that lobbying “helped 
officials and citizens to function as the scope, procedures, and agenda of governance 
underwent dramatic transformation.”11  
 In the late 1870s Senator Roscoe Conkling of New York was the head of the so 
called “Stalwart Republicans” and openly took on President Rutherford B. Hayes as the 
executive branch attempted to institute much needed civil service reforms.  In response 
to many federal positions being used as favors for loyal supporters, Hayes had issued 
an executive order banning political intimidation of civil servants by state party bosses.  
Conkling exercised enough power that he was able to generally disregard Hayes’ order 
and went as far as instructing Naval Officer Alonzo Cornell to pay no attention to 
President’s Hayes instructions as to who would be put in charge of the New York 
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Customs House.  Hayes was forced to wait out Conkling and use a Congressional 
recess in order to embed his own selections.12 
 By 1881 Senator Conkling had played his hand too hard by so openly 
challenging the executive branch and opinion turned markedly against some of the 
more obvious issues with treating almost all federal positions as political appointments.  
He was forced to resign from the Senate when President James Garfield took office and 
immediately started more in depth reforms in the civil service system.  Until that time 
most jobs were dispersed through the “spoils system,” where politicians would have the 
ability to appoint loyal followers to almost any governmental position.  Garfield 
immediately initiated investigations into criminal activities related to the hiring of 
individuals for federal employment, including bribery, voter fraud, corruption, and 
intimidation.  Conkling, an enthusiastic exploiter of using appointments and the inherent 
related potential criminal activities, left office before he could be charged with anything 
specific.13 
 In the late 1880s and early 1890s Matthew Stanley Quay of Pennsylvania rose in 
prominence at state level government positions, quickly becoming the state treasurer, 
and within three years of entering the scene, being selected as United States senator.  
After merely three years in the Senate, he managed to weave his way into Senate 
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leadership and also became the Republican Party National Chairman.  During this time 
it quickly came to the surface that he used a large number of federal level patronage 
jobs in order to grow and maintain his position of power in the party.14 Though giving 
away patronage jobs was not abnormal for the era, Quay took it to a level that even 
fellow senators saw as almost egregious.  In an 1890 quote against Senator Quay from 
Representative Berger, the Congressman stated,  
If it is to be crucified, it is only because its chosen leaders have bartered 
away its principles for the tricks and petty schemes of politician.  The  
Judas Iscariot of 2,000 years ago is to find a counterpart in the Judas  
Iscariot of today.  Judas, who took thirty pieces of silver and went hanged 
himself, has left an example for the Matt Quays that is well worthy of  
their imitation.15  
 
 This caustic and dramatic statement by a sitting United States representative 
towards a sitting United States senator would be considered biting even today, but is 
even more so the case coming from an era when politicians, at least publicly, typically 
attempted to hold themselves above petty jealousies.   
 In 1898 Senator Quay was charged with conspiring with other politicians and 
private individuals to use public moneys for their own use.  He came out claiming that 
this “dastardly attack of malevolent enemies,” would be shown to be of no truth.16 
Progressive activists considered Quay a leading target in their crusade to remove party 
bosses from all levels of government. They concentrated their efforts on defeating Quay 
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when he stood for reelection to a third term in 1899. They ultimately succeeded in 
deadlocking the Pennsylvania legislature and preventing his selection, but the governor 
reappointed Quay to the Senate.  Immediately his ability to serve was challenged. The 
legislator held a vote, and by a single ballot he was denied his seat until he was finally 
recognized by a new legislature in 1901. Physically and mentally fatigued from this 
hostile confrontation, Quay never fully recovered, and in early 1904 he returned to his 
home in Beaver, Pennsylvania, where he soon died.17  
 An example of the power that political machines wielded can be tied to the 
Aldrich machine in late 19th and early 20th century Rhode Island, named after the long 
serving Senator Nelson Aldrich, the Senate Majority Leader.  Though a small state 
physically and by population, senators from Rhode Island had an inordinate say in 
Washington due to the simple fact that the states constitution was set up to benefit an 
almost aristocratic population base where representation was set up on geographic 
areas versus equal populations.  Small towns, generally home to prosperous farmers 
and businessmen, had approximately four times the representation than the cities that 
contained two thirds, and generally poorer segment, of the state’s population.  No 
matter how terrible a senator seemed to the general population of Rhode Island, the 
state legislature could not be forced to bring them home.  Rural prejudices against 
urban areas and occurrences of bribery by the Aldrich machine ensured a small 
segment of the population gave a trifling number of men the ability to control the 
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legislature, the courts, and ultimately who chose United States senators.  “Interests,” 
corporations, or people who wanted to influence national level legislation, saw Rhode 
Island’s senators as an inexpensive purchase, and Senator Aldrich was a more than 
willing participant.  Aldrich combined his corrupt practices with those of Senate Minority 
Leader Arthur Gorman and controlled any and all legislation that was to be introduced, 
protecting their benefactors in all but the most extreme of bad actions.  This 
concentration of power in two men’s hands laid bare to the nation at large the inordinate 
influence special interests had in government.18  
 The United States Senate had a hearing of its own in 1909 deliberating the effect 
corporate and other private interests had on the actions of the Senate and towards 
individual senators.  In an amazingly candid conversation, Henry Osborne Havemeyer, 
a president of the American Sugar Refining Company, simply stated “It is my impression 
that whenever there is a dominant party, wherever the majority is large, that is the party 
that gets the contribution, because that is the party which controls the local matters.”19  
He went on to state that these contributions were made specifically because companies 
and other organizations had large interests to protect, and had little or nothing to do with 
political ideologies or common interests other than maintain their positions.20  
 A third reason for the push for the direct election of senators was the activist 
journalists of the day.  These “muckrakers” would leave an indelible mark on opinions of 
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both politicians and the public.  An entire industry developed around the basic idea that 
many senators were naturally corrupt as individuals and that the whole group entered 
office to only advance themselves and their moneyed benefactors.  In 1906 a series of 
articles by David Graham Phillips were published in Cosmopolitan magazine, at the time 
a current interest publication and not the fashion/women’s print it has since become.  
Titled “The Treason of the Senate” it helped to put the United States Senate at the 
middle of the Progressive push to make the government better representatives to the 
average voter.  It bluntly started with “Treason is a strong word, but not too strong to 
characterize the situation in which the Senate is the eager, resourceful, and 
indefatigable agent of interests as hostile to the American people as any invading army 
could be.” This frank declaration was just an introduction to the subject of Senate 
malfeasance and was followed with a nine part series that discussed the overbearing 
influence large corporations and wealthy sponsors had on the legislative process, how 
post-Civil War politics had led to a system that was becoming more susceptible to 
bribery, fraud, and gridlock, and the conviction of two senators on charges of corruption 
in the previous year.21   
 Unethical behavior by state level politicians added to the corroded patina of 
public trust as local and state politicians were consistently being found to have 
conducted themselves in less than honorable ways.  Since these men were the ones 
that ultimately chose senators, it was readily believed that senators must be of the same 
cloth.  There was much hostility towards Phillips and his “Treason of the Senate” serial. 
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Other journalists and many politicians critiqued his writing as he liberally used inference 
and exaggeration in many parts of his story, though few would call him an outright liar.  
Criticisms from populist leaders such as President Theodore Roosevelt marked the 
series as something much less than fully truthful, even using the series to actually coin 
the term “muckraker.”  Much of the public took Phillips at his word and saw criticisms of 
his writing as an almost protective racket from politicians protecting their turf and 
journalists trying to keep access to those in power.  The general population held on to 
Phillips’ every word and public opinion quickly went against the selection of senators 
and the real push for direct elections gained purchase.22 The eventual adoption of the 
Seventeenth Amendment seemed to reflect the popular dissatisfaction with the 
apparent corruption and inefficiency that had come to characterize the legislative 
election of United States senators in many states. 
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CHAPTER 4. CHANGES DURING THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 
Initiating Change in the Senate and in the Constitution 
 As early as 1826 there was a movement to make direct elections of United 
States senators the law.  Legislation was pushed to the Senate as early as 1850, but it 
was met with “disfavor” and was not seriously brought up again until the end of the 19th 
century.  Andrew Johnson of Tennessee pushed for reform of how senators gained 
office as a representative (1851), as a senator (1860), and as president (1868).1  By 
1887 leaders and members of the State Grange of Illinois, a fraternal order dedicated to 
the assistance of farmers and other various agricultural pursuits, started petitioning their 
state legislature, governor, and federal representatives to propose a Constitutional 
amendment calling for the direct election of United States senators.2  Starting in 1892 
the National People's, or Populist Party, included as part of their platform the popular 
election of U.S. Senators. After absorbing the Populist Party in 1896 the Democratic 
Party continued the call for reform.  Progressive Republicans, including Theodore 
Roosevelt, also backed the idea.3 In the following two decades, Utah (1897), the Illinois 
Grange (1898), Colorado (1901), and Louisiana (1907) made similar proposals.4   
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 Starting in 1888 a system of direct primaries started to develop, and by 1910 
forty-four of forty-six states had primary election laws and twenty-eight of those states 
provided for the nomination of candidates for the senate.  This allowed the voting public 
a certain amount of say into who the state United States Senator would be, as the 
political party who received the most votes would also get to choose the next senator.  
By 1909 the “Oregon system” allowed for a straw poll to guide who a state would 
choose as a senator.  The general idea of the straw poll was that the public would be 
allowed a vote during the normal election cycle as to who the next senator would be.  
Since it was up to the state legislatures to choose these positions, they were under no 
legal obligation to follow the results, but state level politicians quickly realized the 
dangers of going against public opinion in such a blatant way.  This worked well enough 
that the Republican dominated state legislature chose a Democrat as senator since he 
won the poll at the general election.  By this time thirty-seven states had some level of 
input from the public as to who would be chosen as senator.  The Seventeenth 
Amendment formalized and made universal the senate selection/election processes, but 
in the process totally removed state legislature input on the method.5   
 Though most of a century passed between the initial idea of a popular election of 
senators and the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, many states had already 
started pressuring the national government to change the method by which senators 
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were selected.6  This popular and state level pressure remains the only time in 
American history when a true grassroots movement forced the federal government’s 
hand.  Other Progressive Era amendments, especially Prohibition and Women’s 
Suffrage, had a lot of popular support, but at the time of their passage not enough to 
cause a fear of a new Constitutional Convention.7  
 A myriad of different reasons pressured politicians at all levels of government to 
change the make-up of the Senate, or at minimum, change how these positions were to 
be filled.  Some of the ideas came from what were nominally ideologically consistent, 
national political parties that were absorbing platforms from numerous third parties and 
forming what are now the dominant Republican and Democratic parties of the modern 
era.  Many in the public started to see the state and federal level politics as becoming 
too intertwined and wanted to sever the direct connection between the state legislatures 
and the national legislature in order to ensure issues that were at the forefront of 
national interests did not come to control the direction of state level debates.8 
 As early as 1900 Pennsylvania had started pushing for an Article V convention, 
which specifically called for the direct election of senators, but could have done much 
more to alter the fabric of the Constitution.  This signified the spread of the idea from the 
agriculturally based West and Midwest and into the industrial and population centers on 
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the East Coast.  This displayed that the movement had enough momentum to counter 
the political machines.   By 1912 thirty-one states, only one short of the needed two-
thirds to call a convention, had either officially asked for a convention or had asked 
Congress to fix the problem or face the repercussions.  This brought concern among 
many in the Senate and forced Congress act.9     
 Seeing the almost certain passage of a new amendment, with the individual 
states making significant headway towards initiating their separate Constitutional 
Conventions, the United States House of Representatives was left little choice but to 
issue its own direct election of senators resolution, named House Joint Resolution 39.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
House Joint Resolution 39 was initially passed on 1 May 1911 by the full House of 
Representatives, then heavily revised by Kansas Republican Senator Joseph L. 
Bristow, removing what was known as a “Race Rider.”  This “Race Rider” states, “The 
times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators shall be as prescribed in 
each State by the legislature thereof.” would have put all senatorial election law-making 
past the actual direct election of United States senators, into the individual states’ 
hands, and would have banned any other federal actions against the states, even in the 
event of mass racial discrimination.  After Senator Bristow’s amendment was added to 
the Joint Resolution it became the face of the Seventeenth Amendment.  Ensuring 
Federal election laws would be honored by the individual states, the new House Joint 
resolution passed both houses of Congress and was rather quickly ratified as the 
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Seventeenth Amendment when the required number of states approved it over the next 
two years.10   
 Surprisingly, state level versions of this “Race Rider” survived in the South until 
the late 1940s in the form of “white primaries.” In many Southern states, particularly 
those from the old Confederacy, individual political parties were deemed to be private 
organizations, therefore able to include or exclude any particular person or groups of 
people at will.  The Democratic Party, since it was politically in total control of Deep 
South politics until the late 1960s, was able to have closed primaries, where white 
voters would nominate their candidate and then run, often unopposed, in general 
elections.  This gave African American voters no real choice in their representation, 
even though they technically, if not in practice, had the full right to vote in the general 
election.  Once these “white primaries” were banned by the Supreme Court in Smith v. 
Allwright, (1944) other forms of electoral control rose up.  “White primaries” were not the 
first, and would not be the last attempt at the disenfranchisement of African 
Americans.11 
 Once the House of Representatives issued its own resolution, and with senator 
Bristow’s continued assistance, the United States Senate was forced to finally realize 
that they had to go along with public opinion and help to develop what became the 
Seventeenth Amendment, and they needed to do as much as possible in order to 
control the potential damage that might be done to the United States Senate.  Even 
                                                          
 10 United States House of Representatives. “House Joint Resolution 39 proposing an Amendment  to the 
Constitution, including the “Race Rider,” May 1, 1911.” Washington, DC: National Archives and Records 
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though there had been decades of attempts at making direct elections a reality, it took 
the threat of a Constitutional Convention to encourage enough senators to agree to this 
dramatic change.12  Notwithstanding this huge change in Constitutional law, the initial 
effects of the Seventeenth Amendment appeared minimal to the public.  The general 
lack of interest by the average American and the lack of distinction as to the before and 
after effects of the amendment were packaged in a way to elicit little apprehension.  As 
Daniel and Stephen Wirls describe the situation,  
The consequences of a directly elected Senate were fairly subtle not only 
because of the ways in which many senators were elected de facto, prior  
to the amendment, but also because national politics probably did little to  
make the distinction between the selection by state legislatures and direct 
elections very interesting.13 
 The legislative and daily activities of an average senator did not change much 
before or after the enactment of the amendment, but over time the influence of the 
individual states have become weaker and power more centralized with the national 
political parties over the concerns of the many states.14   
 The reassigning of power from state legislatures to the general American 
population was a dramatic turn from the Federalism the Founding Fathers intended, and 
an abandonment of the Senate as a representative body for the individual states.  It was 
a major victory for the Progressive Era politicians and movement in attempting to align 
the Senate with the ideals of popular democratic government.15  The Progressive 
movement wanted to move the United States Senate from its role as a great 
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deliberative body responsible for longer term thinking than the House of 
Representatives, not bound to public pressures, into an organization that bent directly to 
the will of the people.  Instead of patterning on the idea of the Roman Senate, with 
ranks of distinguished citizens, it was to act as a separate, and equal branch to the 
House of Representatives, though elected in the exact same way, with the exact same 
external pressures.16 The Senate is no longer a direct link between the individual states 
and the federal government.  Originally senators only had direct responsibility to the 
professional legislators that would keep them in office, people that could at least be 
reasoned with to understand long term implications of specific votes and have the 
benefit of experience and inside information on specific laws and regulations.  After the 
passage of the Seventeenth Amendment senators were now subject to the impulse of 
public opinion, which can be difficult to ascertain at best, and is often capricious and 
fleeting. 
 Much of the argument for the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment was that 
senators gained their positions and retained an almost lifelong grip on power through 
some sort of nepotistic dealing.  In reality, it has been shown that the passage of the 
amendment dramatically increased the propensity of a senator to stand for reelection 
and remain in a senatorial position for longer amounts of time than was evident pre-
1913.  In conjunction with longer tenures of office, a study by William Bernhard and 
Brian R. Sala in The Journal of Politics showed that the Seventeenth Amendment had a 
moderating effect on a senator’s voting record.  They show that the last two years of a 
senator’s term seem to demonstrate a tendency to restrain themselves and take a more 
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“middle of the road” decision making process, setting themselves up for the next 
reelection campaign.17  It can be argued that this shift in “late-term roll-call behavior,” as 
the authors call it, is directly due to the general populations supposed relatively short 
term memories as to a senators voting record.  Theoretically, the professional politicians 
in a state legislature that formerly chose the senators would be more apt to remember a 
specific United States senators total voting record for their entire term, and 
reselect/reelect, or not, based on the total picture of a their record, and not just what has 
happened in the very recent past.   
 Many of the current ideas on the impact of the Seventeenth Amendment rely on 
information available from more conservative leaning websites and news related groups 
tied to attempting to overturn the Sixteenth Amendment (Income Taxes) and the 
Seventeenth Amendment.  In researching a large number of sources for this thesis it 
proved difficult to find any real commentary on the Seventeenth Amendment from a 
liberal or progressive perspective.  It is not certain whether this is due to a general 
acceptance of the provisions involved or just a lack of concern on the subject all 
together.  In contrast, conservative politicians and dignitaries have openly critiqued the 
idea of the Seventeenth Amendment.   
 Senator Mike Lee of Utah has stated that he would favor repeal of the 
amendment.  Former Arkansas governor Mike Huckabee has called it “one of the 
dumbest things we ever did.”  Former Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia stated in 
2010 that he would be for overturning the amendment.  "The 17th Amendment has 
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changed things enormously," Scalia said, "We changed that in a burst of progressivism 
in 1913, and you can trace the decline of so-called states' rights throughout the rest of 
the 20th century."18 At minimum, many of the opponents of these amendments have 
goals of severely limiting or even shutting down many of the regulatory bodies that are 
seen as restrictive to both individual citizen’s rights and States’ rights per the Ninth and 
Tenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.  This mass of unseemly 
regulatory issues includes bodies of law from the Progressive Era and many agencies 
and laws developed since that time, not limited to, but often centered on the regulation 
of various types of businesses and all levels of government.  It is easy enough to see 
the argument opponents of the amendment have made, specifically about the issue of 
the diminishment of state authority over the federal government when it comes to 
powers enumerated in the United States Constitution. 
The Evolution of the Senate and the Lead Up to the Seventeenth Amendment 
 The establishment of the United States Senate was tied directly to the Founders’ 
opinion that the idea of federalism and states’ rights were intertwined in the 
development of the nation.  James Madison was explicit about this idea as he wrote in 
the Federalist Papers various opinions such as the simple idea that states, were not 
subservient to the nation at large, but in reality independent nations tied to each other 
by larger policy.  He saw that, and appreciated, the idea that a small number of states 
would be able to place “great obstacles to the concert and accomplishment of the secret 
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wishes of an unjust and interested majority.”19  He had a fear that the “autonomy, 
power, and selfish parochialism” were a fundamental flaw in the nascent American form 
of government and could eventually subvert national interests and pose threats towards 
individual rights.  A solution to the problem of too much power to the individual states 
was to form an upper house that would give each state an equal say in the process of 
governance, hopefully mitigating some of the potential issues that could easily lead to 
an anarchic or nihilistic type state of government.20 
 There were three primary differences in the composition of the House of 
Representatives and the United States Senate.  The length of the term of office was six 
years, three times longer than that of a Representative.  With more infrequent potential 
to lose a seat, the senator was supposedly more able to escape the political and 
societal pressures that were assumed to come down on someone that would constantly 
be running for office.  The staggered terms structured into the selection of senators 
allowed for a more gentle transition of power between ideologies, at least in theory, and 
ensured a more solid base of historical precedent than the House, where wave 
elections have sometimes thrown leadership and policy into disarray.  The mode of 
appointment was, at the time the Constitution was designed, probably the most distinct 
dissimilarity from the House, and possibly even distinct from almost any other office on 
the United States political landscape.  Being chosen by each state legislature instead of 
the general population insured an almost insular mindset from many of these senators, 
as they did not have to worry as much about public perceptions, instead they had to 
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ensure that they properly and faithfully acted as trustees not only for the nation as a 
whole, but for the individual states themselves.21  
 From early in its history the Senate generally mirrored, closely, if not perfectly, 
the partisan composition of the House of Representatives.  Even though the Senate had 
rather obvious differences in structure and in culture, so many senators left office early 
in order to enter a variety of other pursuits that replacements often times bore little 
resemblance politically to those that they had replaced as state legislatures were also 
subject to rapid change, as elections were held annually in many states.22  Though 
theoretically independent of traditional political pressures, senators in the 19th century 
were still subject to many of the same public pressures.  This is especially so as the 
idea of doctrine of instruction by state legislatures started to fade away and 
campaigning by prospective senators started to replace this idea.  The idea of doctrine 
of instruction was simply the concept that state legislative leaders should be able to tell 
United States Senators how to vote on specific pieces of legislation.  Throughout the 
early history of the Senate some senators would take the advice to heart, others would 
do as they pleased, potentially facing the wrath of state level legislatures.  As time 
progressed senators became highly independent, at least publicly.23  As these potential 
senators helped get state level legislators elected promises made to the general 
population had to be upheld, at least to a point.  It soon became apparent that the 
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population had a lot of control over the Senate, though in a decidedly filtered way.  State 
level officials that chose national officers unwisely were quickly replaced, leading to 
many one term senators.24  
 Progressive Era activists, starting in the late 19th Century and peaking in the 
second decade of the 20th century, pressed for government, cultural, and societal 
transformation at a pace faster than ever before that period of United States history.  It 
has perhaps not been matched in the intensity of change since, barring potentially the 
certain portions of the Civil Rights and related movements of the 1950s and 1960s.  The 
development of the Progressive movement traveled at a blistering pace, with a rapid 
expansion at the local and state level in many places during the 1890s.  It started 
gaining traction on the federal level during the Theodore Roosevelt Administration, 
carried on with Howard Taft, and reached its apogee under Woodrow Wilson.  This 
resulted in a large volume of new laws, regulations, statutes and other types of 
legislation.25  
 Reforms such as the Workman’s Compensation Act, the nation’s first direct 
primary system, the Pure Food and Drug Act, the Federal Reserve Act and Federal 
Trade Commission Act, along with an almost limitless list of other laws, actions, and 
regulations were initiated and passed during this timeframe that would have a 
tremendous effect of the track the United States would take into the future.  This 
represents just a short list of political reforms of the period.26  While these new actions 
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were being passed, other, existing parts of the Federal government were being 
strengthened, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the United States 
Post Office.  The nation even saw the admission of two new states directly before the 
Seventeenth Amendment’s passage, Arizona and New Mexico, based loosely on their 
promise to support the passage of an amendment concerning the direct election of 
senators.27  The era led to the rapid implementation of four new amendments in a 
historically short seven year time frame, the most active timeframe for amendment 
adoption since the initial ratification of the original Bill of Rights in the 1790s, and 
arguably the most impactful barring possibly the enactments of the Thirteenth through 
Fifteenth Amendments in the late1860s and early 1870s. 
 By the early 1910s thirty-one state legislatures had already developed and sent 
resolutions to Congress demanding a constitutional amendment providing for the direct 
election of senators, rather than the preexisting method of selection by the state 
legislatures.  This overwhelming support forced Congress’ hand and ensured that this 
overhaul of the United States Constitution was pushed through in a rapid pace.  During 
this time veritable armies of reformers were pushing a myriad of ideas for changes at 
every level of government, trying for a more democratic method of governance, along 
with more professional management of cities and states, and even the change of the 
capitalistic mindset.28  
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Legislators Argue to Shed Their Constitutional Responsibility 
 State level legislatures, or at least individual legislators, started discussing the 
idea of direct elections as early as 1872, when the Nebraska Republican Party added 
the idea to their official platform and continued through the ratification of the 
Seventeenth Amendment.  During the ensuing 41 years 220 state party platforms and 
19 national party platforms called for direct elections of some sort.  State legislatures 
started calling for action as well during this era.  In 1874, the California State Legislature 
called for a change to the system, and by 1913 the United States Congress had 
received 175 letters or other actions from various state legislatures.  By 1912 thirty-
three states had some sort of direct primary set up, though faithless electors in the 
legislature were not legally bound to stick by public votes, and the only real 
repercussion would be at the next election cycle one or two years down the road.29  
 One of the watershed moments for the national push for direct elections of United 
States senators occurred in 1909 when Senator William “The Blond Boss” Lorimer of 
Illinois was embroiled in a scandal that caused such a furor that the Senate had little 
choice but to change their method of gaining office.  The Illinois legislature had been 
deadlocked for five months, finally deciding to choose six term United States 
Representative William Lorimer to become their new senator.  Charges of bribery and 
corruption were leveled immediately.  A yearlong investigation showed that four state 
level politicians, members of what became known as the “Jackpot Legislature,” had 
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accepted payments from a $100,000 corporate “slush fund.” The Senate investigated 
these charges and in 1912 declared Lorimer’s selection invalid.  Since the selection was 
invalid Lorimer’s removal did not count as an expulsion.30 
 Lorimer’s removal from office encouraged sitting United States senators to finally 
start pushing for a change to the system.  Even as Lorimer was being removed from 
office he had supporters argue that his removal was not necessary and that the 
selection process was still a valid method.  Senator Gamble of South Dakota argued 
that keeping the status quo was desirable, but not as a defense over what transpired 
around the Lorimer selection, but more as a defense against actions against current and 
future senators, whom he saw as open for attack if a sitting senator was removed. 
Newly elected Senator Joseph Bristow of Kansas, trying to fulfill a major part of his 
election platform, proposed adding a provision for direct elections of senators to the 
income tax amendment resolution that was then being debated.31  The Senate majority 
leader, Republican Nelson Aldrich, objected to the provision as not being pertinent to 
the original resolution and quashed the idea, but also did not publicly disavow the need 
for something to be done about the selection/election process.  Though it was not 
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added to what eventually became the Sixteenth Amendment, the seriousness of the 
issue was now evident to even the most recalcitrant senators.32   
 Press reports around the nation started adding tremendous pressure to the 
United States Senate.  Writers and editors from many major, and minor, newspapers 
started calling for a change in the selection/election process, with almost all of the 
bitterness aimed at the Illinois legislature and the obvious malevolent dealings they took 
part in in 1909.  The Buffalo Courier backed Senator Cummins of Iowa in his quest of 
prosecuting and removing Lorimer no matter the outcome of the Senate committee 
report.  The Kansas City Times said that Lorimer and the United States Senate were on 
trial.  The Memphis Commercial-Appeal stated that no matter the outcome of the 
investigation put the blame not only on Lorimer and Illinois, but squarely on the 
processes that the Senate used in both selection and in going after bad actors.  The 
Toledo Blade went as far as to impugn the honor of several senators.  The Galesburg 
Republican-Register used the entire issue as the primary example of why the Senate 
needed to be directly elected by the people.33 
 A number of states had already taken the initiative and implemented what was 
known as the “Oregon system.”34  Under this idea the legislature would still choose the 
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senator for their individual state, but in each election cycle they would have to state on 
their ballot whether or not they would abide by a legally non-binding vote by the voters 
on who should be the United States senator for their state.  Though any individual 
legislator could ignore their publicly stated position, it was something that could very 
easily be used against them during the next election cycle, so there is no evidence of 
any legislator breaking his promise.  By 1908, twenty-eight states used some version of 
the Oregon system or a related idea of direct election, including the initiative process 
and other various types of new legislation.35  
 Problems arose with the “Oregon system” frequently enough that it was soon 
seen as little more than a stop gap measure before something else had to be done in 
the selection/election process.  By promising to vote for a specific candidate in late 
summer and early fall primaries senate candidates had plenty of time to either fall out of 
favor with the general voting public and/or state legislature, or to have unethical or 
illegal activities come to light and still theoretically have enough pledges to go the 
United States Senate.  An example of this is was from 1909 in North Dakota when C.B. 
Little was the candidate of choice for a large number of incoming state legislators, but 
was eventually beaten by Martin Johnson.  Not only did Little lose, he ended up placing 
fourth in the process.  Though not legally obligated to put a specific person into office, 
several members of the North Dakota legislature had committed a breach of trust and 
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caused debate both between politicians and in the general public, with many upset that 
their choice was ignored.36  
 The election season in 1910 saw a large number of new senators entering 
Congress, many replacing members who seemed to be leaving in order to not have to 
vote on a potential direct election provision.  Some of the more powerful senators to 
leave included Beveridge, Warner, Burkett, and Young.  Most of the replacement 
senators, except for Reed of Missouri, were expected to be willing to at least debate the 
merits of a constitutional amendment, and even Reed was seen as potentially on board 
given the proper circumstance.37  
 During the debates over the Seventeenth Amendment, Elihu Root, New York 
Senator, a former Secretary of State and Secretary of War, and future Nobel Peace 
Prize winner, recognized issues with its ratification. He said that in the original approach 
of selecting senators the people were as Ulysses, heroically bound to the mast that: 
he might not yield to the song of the siren . . . . so the American democracy  
has bound itself . . . and made it practically impossible that the impulse, the 
prejudice, the excitement, the frenzy of the moment shall carry our  
democracy into those excesses which have wrecked all our prototypes in  
history. No one,” Root argued, “can foresee the far-reaching effect of  
changing the language of the Constitution in any manner which affects  
the relations of the States to the General Government. How little we  
know what any amendment would produce!38 
 
                                                          
 36 Schiller, Wendy J., and Stewart III, Charles. Electing the Senate: Indirect Democracy Before the 
Seventeenth Amendment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014. 
 37 Chicago Daily Tribune (1872-1922) "Direct Elections At Hand." Apr 15, 1911. 
http://proxy.buffalostate.edu:2048/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.proxy.buffalostate.edu/docview/173564204?accountid=7259. 
 38 Jay S. Bybee. "Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens' Song of the Seventeenth 
Amendment" 1997. University of Nevada, Las Vegas- William S. Boyd School of Law; Scholarly Works. 
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/350. 
79 
 
 The debates over the adoption and ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, 
in the popular press, the public, in state legislatures, and in Congress focus almost 
entirely on the expansion of democracy and the elimination of corruption, but did not 
have any real discussion on the impact on federalism.  A few exceptions to this exist.  In 
1894 Representative Franklin Bartlett, a New York Democrat, stated that the interests of 
the states needed to be preserved by keeping senators as representatives to the states.  
Senator Hoar, a Republican from Massachusetts, in 1893, defended the indirect 
elections of senators, saying “state legislatures are the bodies of men most interested of 
all others to preserve State jurisdiction… It is well that the members of one branch of 
the Legislature should look to them for their re-election, and it is a great security for the 
rights of the States.”  In 1911 the aforementioned Senator Elihu Root argued against 
direct elections of senators.  He claimed that selected senators were the only way to 
ensure the sovereignty of the states and elections would rob these states “of power, of 
dignity, of consequence” and would degrade their usefulness to their citizens.  He 
feared that removing this power from the states would result in an expansion of the 
federal government, saying “the tide that now sets toward the Federal Government will 
swell in volume and in power.”39 
 California was the only state to put the direct election of United States senators, 
or any amendment, on a ballot and allow the general public to have a direct say in the 
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process.  The amendment passed overwhelmingly and California became one of the 
first states to ratify the Seventeenth Amendment.40 
 Contrary to modern practice, prior to 1913 United States senators were selected 
by their state legislatures, the governor of a particular state in certain, specific 
situations, or a combination of the two.  They were typically seasoned politicians, 
veterans of debates and the legislative process, and perhaps most importantly, fully in 
tune to the specific wants and needs of their home states.  The overarching idea in the 
Senate’s original arrangement was to ensure that the smaller states by population had 
representation equal to the more populated states, at least in one chamber of 
Congress.41  An added benefit to this circumstance was that it also protected individual 
senators from the often unstable and even unhinged nature of public opinion, along with 
avoiding the direct pressures that the directly elected members of the United States 
House of Representatives were constantly open to.42  Senators were expected to look 
at the long term benefits any individual piece of legislation would have on their home 
state, take whatever  time was needed to debate the specific matters, and resolve any 
particular issues, and was deliberately arranged to move at what could be considered a 
glacial pace.  Being able to disregard public pressures, a senator was supposed to be 
able to look at the big picture of what the national government was doing, especially so 
since they did not have to worry about running a traditional campaign.  They had much 
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longer terms of office then representatives and the president, and they were responsible 
to and reported to other professional politicians at the state level, men who understood 
(or were supposed to at least) the long term outlook that was the Senate’s purview. The 
many states’ legislatures were to select a senator that they felt best benefitted their 
particular state.43   
 As previous excerpts from the United States Constitution have shown, the writers 
of the Constitution designed the United States Senate to be the representative body for 
the individual States,44 seen as an almost amalgamation of independent countries under 
a common, singular national policy.  It was assumed that a group of mature, 
professional politicians could be trusted in making educated decisions with the insider’s 
information they had at hand would make more prudent and informed decisions then the 
general population.45  As part of the Great, or Connecticut, Compromise of 1787, the 
House of Representatives favored states with larger populations, so those members 
would be chosen directly by the people, on a strict population centric formula, with 
specific geographically designated districts within each state.  Since the idea of 
Federalism established the division of power between the federal government and the 
states,46 it shows an equality of power between the different levels of federal and state 
governments, more akin to a husband and wife style relationship, instead of a 
connection more similar to that of a parent and child.   
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 The earlier Virginia Plan would have had the House of Representatives choose 
the senators from a list provided by the individual states, but it was quickly decided that 
this choice should be up to the states entirely, and not representatives from other parts 
of the country.47  The Founders’ original intent was to have a central government for the 
most basic of tasks, such as defense and foreign policy, with little else remaining in their 
purview.  States were to remain highly independent from each other and only give in to 
national pressures when absolutely necessary.  To ensure that this power balance was 
maintained, it was important for senators to have the interests of their individual states 
in mind, and not the general election pressures that representatives had and continue to 
have to concern themselves with.   
 The national government was set up in the nation’s early days as a safety net of 
sorts.  Anything not directly related to international relations or matters of war were the 
responsibility of the lowest level of government possible.  This “creative federalism” 
limited the numbers and types of programs the federal government could initiate.  Often 
times the only influence that could be put on to state and lower levels was by the central 
government funding specific plans, but even then it was often difficult to force an issue 
once money was distributed among the states.48 
An Era of Change at the Federal Government Level 
 There is little doubt that the Progressive Era, and specifically the laws, rules, and 
regulations that resulted from it, led directly to a massive change in the association 
between the average American citizen and the government at every level, along with a 
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different form of relationship between the various echelons of government.  This era of 
great change transformed the political, social, and cultural outlook of the country, 
effecting it to this day.  This time of rapid change is a dividing line between an era of 
laissez faire, individual responsibility, small “r” republicanism, and a relatively small 
federal government, with the modern era’s emphasis on group responsibility and federal 
dominance in many segments of contemporary society.   From the introduction of city 
managers in place of what seemed to be hereditary mayoral positions, ballot initiatives, 
primaries, recalls, referendums, secret ballots, and the like, the “people” were given an 
increased ability to partake in an ostensibly more fair popular electoral process. These, 
and related, actions quickly began to show increased traction at the federal level, 
initially with new regulations on different businesses and industries, then into the realm 
of rapid, massive changes to the way the United States government communicates with 
and regulates increasingly larger segments of American society, along with an entire 
group of amendments the United States Constitution.49   
 Pressure for the popular election of senators came from many different quarters. 
Some legal scholars and historians have described this effort as a core feature of the 
Progressive movement’s drive for the democratization of the American government.  
Independent of its connection to any movement, the push for popular elections of United 
States senators can be traced to actual and perceived evils with the established system 
of selecting senators. Reformers have erringly emphasized that the legislative selection 
of Senators used a considerable amount of a state legislatures’ time and put national 
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issues in a superior position at the expense of local concerns.  Though time was indeed 
used in the debates leading up to senatorial selections, no evidence is present that 
indicates that an unusual amount of time was used for the process.  Keeping in mind 
that at the turn of the 20th century most state legislatures met for a matter of weeks or 
months, often on a biennial basis, saying that time was taken away from local issues is 
specious. It was also contended to have the effect of surrendering the right to choose 
senators to party bosses, ideologically driven caucuses, and the innumerable political 
machines that populated the period, but party insiders, specific ideologies, and political 
parties still have a tremendous say as to who is even in contention for a position.  
Merely moving the final choice to the voters does not remove the possibility of 
corruption and may only provide deniability to the corrupt.50  
 Legislative deadlocks, very common in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
meant that states were left without full representation in the Senate, sometimes for 
years at a time.  To outside observers, stories of bribery and corruption became one of 
the significant and encompassing features of the selection process, making it seem that 
personal wealth and political contacts were preconditions to joining the Senate.  
Structurally, putting the state legislatures between the Senate and the people altered 
the notion of popular representation, even though in theory the general population had 
an indirect control of the senatorial selection situation through the simple act of either 
reelecting legislators that picked reasonable options for the Senate, or replace 
politicians who did not.  It cannot be argued that voters have the aptitude to popularly 
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elect senators, but not the capacity to choose state level representatives.  Some states 
were seen as not being properly represented in the Senate when a minority party was 
able to select a senator because of infighting among larger parties, something not 
regularly done, but common enough to remain a threat.  Similarly, state legislative 
districts were sometimes gerrymandered to a ridiculous extent in order to prevent equal 
representation in the state legislature, meaning that a selected senator might not 
represent the entire state in the traditional definition of the concept.51 
 One of the early advocates for changing the constitutionally mandated practice of 
selecting senators to an election process was James B. Weaver, a former Union Civil 
War General.  Weaver was on the forefront of promoting the idea of the direct election 
of United States senators.  In the early 1880s the former warrior, now politician, ran on 
the Greenback Party ticket for the presidency, but the party received little support on the 
national stage, and was soon absorbed almost wholly into the much more established 
Democratic Party, which shortly integrated some of its more populist ideas in its own 
platform.  As a United States representative from 1884 to 1888, Weaver pushed for the 
free coinage of silver, forfeiture of a large percentage of railroad land grants, increased 
governmental spending on public projects and infrastructure, the creation of the 
Department of Labor, and stridently pushing for the electorate to directly choose 
senators.  None of his ideas were wholly accepted by the United States Congress, at 
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least while Weaver was in office, but he at least started the discussion that would 
blossom under the Progressive Era governments that were soon to follow.52  
 In the early portion of the 20th century the National Progressive League pushed 
for key reforms, reaching a platform of five key developments by 1911 that they 
centered their efforts on.  These concepts were not exclusively just at the national level, 
instead running the gamut from the most basic positions at the local level, at state 
houses and governors’ mansions, all the way through and including the position of 
President of the United States.   
• Direct primaries, where candidates would be popularly chosen for each political 
party by the general electorate instead of the more common at the time selection 
of party insiders.  
• Direct democracy, with a one man, one vote concept, and the idea that many 
laws and regulations could be voted on directly by the citizenry instead of a 
permanent political class.  
• Popular election of United States senators, as shown with a number of existing 
and tentatively planned state level measures, and eventually the Seventeenth 
Amendment.  
• Popular election of delegates to the GOP national convention, versus the more 
traditional appointments of party insiders.  
• Effective anticorruption acts that would, amongst other ideals, keep business and 
politics separate, punish overt and covert episodes of fraud, embezzlement, and 
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bribery, and any number of other supposed issues present at every level of 
government and society.53 
 In an analysis of the political economy origins of the Seventeenth Amendment, 
T.J. Zywicki notes that in the 1880s there was growing dissatisfaction with the indirect 
system of senatorial selections and public criticism began to escalate beyond low key 
grumblings and entered the public spotlight. During this timeframe, many states began 
to increase the use of extra-constitutional means to move towards popular election of 
senators.54  Specific approaches, primarily the public canvass and pledged state 
legislators, allowed for direct public participations in Senate elections.  The resulting 
legislative actions provide some indication that these preliminary efforts led to a change 
in ideology and attitude of the average senator, not necessarily the passage of the 
Seventeenth Amendment.55 
 During the Progressive Era a series of four constitutional amendments were 
passed, starting in 1913 with both the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments (income 
taxes and the direct election of United States senators, respectively), to the Eighteenth 
Amendment (banning the manufacture and sale of alcohol) in 1919, and the Nineteenth 
Amendment (women’s suffrage), finally taking effect in 1920. Of the three amendments 
passed during this era, and not eventually repealed, it could be reasoned the 
Nineteenth Amendment (women’s suffrage) may very well be the only one with long 
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term beneficial results, namely the expansion of the franchise to a large portion of the 
population.  The Sixteenth Amendment (income taxes) and Seventeenth Amendment 
(direct elections of United States senators) were anathema to the original goals of the 
writers of the United States Constitution and have inarguably developed into an ever 
expanding federal government.  In the century since the passage of these amendments 
the subject has been covered in few texts dedicated just to their passage, but tied in 
with many writings related to the general Progressive Era.56 
 Materials from the National Archives, the United States House of 
Representatives, the United States Senate, private organizations such as State Grange 
of Illinois and other such groups show some of the federal level, state level, and local 
level resolutions in places such as Utah and Louisiana.  This assemblage is in addition 
to information located through private group grassroots movements in the Midwest, 
especially so from among Grange and Farmers groups in the 1880s and 1890s, all 
helping to eventually lead to the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, along with 
untold other Progressive Era laws and regulations. There is a variety of newspaper and 
other articles that discuss the concept, but real examples of reasoning is typically 
glossed over, or seems second and third hand, sometimes anecdotal evidence.  Since 
there have been a rather limited number of attempts at historical investigation into the 
lead up to, the implementation of, and resulting issues of the Seventeenth Amendment, 
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the consolidated base of information gathered in this paper could add to the relatively 
small collection of information that is currently available.57   
 There were numerous other Progressive Era ideas that led to changes in the 
electoral processes and to the government in general.  An idea still present from this era 
of change include the institution Australian Ballot, more commonly known as a secret 
ballot.  The promise of anonymity was not present in the first century of the United 
States, with ballots typically given to voters by the actual political parties, making it 
difficult to avoid external pressures to vote for a specific candidate.  Another idea was 
the implementation of commission based municipal governments with trained experts 
running cities instead of the more traditional political professional.  Many forms of direct 
democracy such as referendums, initiatives, and recalls of elected officials were also 
initiated during this time frame.58 
The Passage of the Seventeenth Amendment 
 The Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which took 
effect in 1913, provided for the direct election of U.S. senators by a traditional majority 
vote by the electorates of the individual states. It transformed the electoral methodology 
established in Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution, which had provided for the 
appointment of senators by the state legislatures. Adopted during the Progressive era of 
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the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it was seen as a means of democratic political 
reform and a huge change towards the ability of the people to have direct say in the 
selection of their senators.  The amendment seemed to reflect the popular 
dissatisfaction with the apparent corruption and inefficiency that had come to 
characterize the legislative election of United States senators in many states.  
 The amendment transformed the phrasing of Article I, Section 3, Paragraph 1 to 
state that “two senators from each State” should be “elected by the people thereof” 
rather than “chosen by the Legislature thereof.” It also revised Paragraph 2 of Section 3 
to allow the state governor, or other member of the executive branch, to fill vacancies in 
the Senate by making temporary appointments to serve until new elections could be 
held.  
The full text of the amendment is as follows: 
-The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from  
each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each senator 
shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications 
requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. 
-When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate,  
the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such 
vacancies: Provided, that the legislature of any State may empower the 
executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the 
vacancies by election as the legislature may direct. 
 
-This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term  
of any senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.59 
 
 By the time of the Seventeenth Amendment’s adoption, many states had already 
established mechanisms that effectively allowed voters to choose the senators of their 
state.  For example, a common practice was having the legislature appoint the winners 
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of party primaries as senators.  This allowed the citizenry to have a certain say in 
senate representation, but also maintained the state legislatures’ ability to choose who 
would be sent to Washington. Nevertheless, the amendment was widely seen as 
necessary to reduce the presumed influence of big business and other special interests 
on the selection of senators and to prevent vacancies or frequent turnover in the Senate 
caused by party wrangling or changes of party leadership at the state level. By the late 
20th century some conservative political scholars called for the repeal of the 
Seventeenth Amendment on the grounds that it undermined the proper balance of 
power between the federal government and the states.60 
 If the interests of state legislatures and the typical state voter sufficiently differed, 
you could expect to find evidence of a fundamental change in senator and winning 
policy outcomes on roll call votes at or near the time of adoption of the Seventeenth 
Amendment.  Tarabar and Hall examined this hypothesis by looking at voting records 
both before and after the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment to determine if the 
general public’s short term goals and a state legislatures longer term goals reflected the 
voting being done by the United States Senate.  They took the time series of senator 
and winning policy philosophies and applied them to a battery of analyses. The 
evidence presented in their work suggests that a change most likely occurred during the 
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54th Congress (1895–1897), suggesting that the Seventeenth Amendment merely 
codified what had already occurred through other means.61  
 MacKenzie focuses on the switch from legislative selection to direct election of 
senators and the change from less to more political experience as was evident from 
1868 to 1944.  Elections led to more professional, more experienced senators on the 
average, but contrary to the popular desire to have politicians who know their jobs well 
this is not necessarily beneficial to the country at large, since it tended to create an 
almost permanent class of senators.  As senators became careerists they gained more 
seniority they also tended to gain access to the top committees.  This was something 
they could then use in reelection campaigns as a positive benefit that they brought to 
the role that by mere lack of experience any challengers would not have for years.  As 
résumés were built after the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment it became more 
common for senators to serve for decades instead of the more typical term or two that 
had been common in the first century of the United States Senate.62 Remarkably, pre-
Seventeenth Amendment senators with seniority in committee assignments and 
leadership, hence the most time in the Senate, typically came from the monolithic one 
party states from the South.  Western states were underrepresented in positions of 
power as political party coalitions could and did fluctuate on regular basis.  This led to a 
surplus of federal funding in the South and to a much lower rate of funding going to the 
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West.  This, along with the agrarian populist movement, put western state legislatures at 
the forefront of the direct election movement.63 
 Lee and Oppenheimer’s work reflects on a discussion with an unnamed senator 
from a small state, who discusses what the American Senate was designed for. “The 
Senate brings with it the responsibility to represent the state governments.  You must 
represent the state’s interests in the major formula programs, such as Title I, Chapter I, 
Education, Medicaid, and Transportation.  It is a special responsibility of senators, they 
are to give states an active policymaking role in federal policy.  That is one of the 
purposes of the Senate envisioned from the beginning.”64 
 In debating the efficacy of the direct election of United States senators, versus 
the selection process that was the mandate for over a century, it is important to 
understand the idealistic philosophies that were present at the Constitutional 
Convention.  One of the prevalent reservations delegates had in Philadelphia was of 
their individual states losing their representative power, with the Articles of 
Confederation already guaranteeing an equal vote at the national assembly.  The 
Senate was established to continue this idea of state equality.  The framers of the 
Constitution could not comprehend senators acting as “representatives” of the general 
population of the country.  James Madison argued in Federalist 63 that the Senate was 
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to “be sometimes necessary as a defense to the people against their own temporary 
errors and delusions.”65 
 As politics has modernized, the alignment of the House of Representatives and 
the Senate has converged and has arguably reversed the intentions of the architects of 
the Constitution.  The job of the senator in many states is now less sheltered than that 
of a typical representative, who often times have used decennial census data to help 
carve out an electorally secure district.  These “gerrymandered” districts, with a loyal 
constituency, can be counted on for an adequate number of votes to persist in office 
unless something dramatic in the voting population’s preferences changes.  Pre-1913, 
the fundamental base of support for a senatorial position was a small group of state 
level legislatures, with a cadre of fellow policymakers that typically had an enhanced, 
more complex knowledge of the workings of government and in general a longer term 
view of the decision making processes.  This allowed for a more nuanced view of 
possible repercussions of laws and regulations on the individual state. Instead of 
political professionals dealing directly with other political professionals the modern 
senator is now obligated to dedicate copious time and effort to constituent relations.  
The senator and the representative have seemingly merged into “the same kind of 
political actor, subject to the same forces.”66  
 Another potential drawback of the Seventeenth Amendment is that senators now 
have to continually fundraise for their next election campaign, along with the national 
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party system.67 Far from removing the legal, moral, and ethical threat of corporations 
and wealthy individuals in the life of the senator, the cost of running a statewide, popular 
primary and general election campaign has forced senators that could have otherwise 
been highly independent of being influenced by the public into a situation that became 
rather similar to what many had been accused of before the ratification of the 
Seventeenth Amendment.  Whereas a senator in the late 19th century may very well 
have accepted money or considerations illegally or unethically, it can be assumed that 
many others could just as easily turned down these attempts.  There was substantial 
support by many state level corporations and local political machines for the idea of 
direct elections, most likely showing that what was detrimental to one group might very 
well be seen as a distinct benefit for another.68   
 With the modern electoral process of constant raising of funds for elections, the 
modern specimen of a senator now has little to no choice but to take money from these 
potentially bad actors, and these monies are now all above board.  It may seem to not 
be of grave importance or consequence, but taking state level legislatures out of the 
manner of selection for United States senators and putting the process into the hands of 
the people has forced senators to raise enormous amounts of money for reelection 
campaigns, have fundraising meetings with lobbyists, and to partake in other activities 
that they had traditionally been insulated from.69 Though lobbyist money and political 
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machine pressures were present in the pre-1913 era the ratification of the Seventeenth 
Amendment has merely shifted a portion of these pressures to a more public version of 
the same.  It has also managed to add the undue pressure of a popular vote and the 
obligatory requirement justifying every vote to a public that may not understand the long 
term consequences of specific measures or the totality of the concerns an individual 
state might have. 
 The enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913 took away much of the 
perceived cushion that senators had from the electorate, and it started to force senators 
to act more as representatives of the people, something that had never been their job or 
prerogative.  The enactment of the amendment was tied to alleged ethical issues, some 
of which did exist, but in reality did little to lessen.  By removing the status of 
representation to the individual states, forcing its members to run traditional campaigns, 
and putting every decision in the public consideration, senators have removed their 
status as distinguished gentlemen and prudent decision makers and instead have 
become six year termed representatives.  No longer eminent political professionals with 
honorable intentions, and even a certain level of aristocratic temperament, instead 
senators now harp about issues that a century ago would have been seen as something 
not appropriate for a person of a senator’s status.  Political stunts such as public 
protests of the prices at the local gas station,70 or whether or not the Food and Drug 
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Administration should be investigating the latest fad in energy drinks71 seem more 
purpose built for a member of the House of Representatives.   
 By the 1970s, as senators became more concerned about elections and less 
concerned about their individual states, representatives, who historically were typically 
only known inside of their districts, started to become more prominent national figures.72 
This sea change has equalized the approaches many national level politicians have.  A 
representative could lie, exaggerate, or commit other bad acts, and still get reelected, 
as long as they ensured as many laws as possible were passed that showed beneficial 
results to their home district, while it was expected that senators had to be straight 
shooters with professional legislatures.  The general thought was that state level 
professional politicians would not be as forgiving of broken promises, knowing the ins 
and outs of particular legislative acts and the actual work and effort the senator had to 
put into any particular activity.73  
 Although the Seventeenth Amendment’s 1913 passage is regarded by many 
historians and political scientists as an enhancement of democratic accountability, the 
relationship between senators and special interests changed dramatically, and not 
necessarily for the betterment of the nation at large. An analysis of the aftereffects of 
the Seventeenth Amendment shows that the public now has potentially less say in the 
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choice in their United States senators, since the role has now gone from senior, 
experienced statesmen with some level of relationship to their state’s elected leadership 
to now individuals who can get considerable fundraising numbers, campaign better than 
the opposition, and those that can make the most promises to the correct groups.  
Zywicki argues that the amendment helped to erode the idea of federalism, the rights of 
states to have full representation at the national level, and even the separation of 
power. There has been an increase in the average length of senatorial tenures, which 
has allowed lobbyists and other interests to engage in longer term relationships with 
specific members, and has basically eliminated the responsibility of state level 
legislatures to monitor the actions of individual senators.  As senator commitment 
moved towards the electorate and away from protecting states’ interests, the Senate 
became as populist and reactionary as the House of Representatives, thus paving the 
way for a much more rapid rate of government growth than was historically evident 
before the Progressive era. This has contributed to one of the biggest issues in public 
policy: the dramatic increase in the size and breadth of the federal government and a 
more centralized control in the United States during the 20th century.74  
 In the 1960s the Supreme Court started mandating that the one man one vote 
ideal was to be institutionalized at all levels of government.  Cases such as Baker v. 
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Carr75 (1961) and Reynolds v. Sims76 (1964) forced state legislatures and other 
governmental bodies to reapportion representation along lines that largely represented 
equally the population of an area.  The only segment of government that this did not 
apply to was the United States Senate, which is constitutionally protected in a way that 
easily leads to malapportionment.77  By 2015 dissent comments by Chief Justice John 
Roberts of the United States Supreme Court on a case involving the Arizona State 
Legislature and the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission showed some of the 
history that the state of Arizona played in the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment, 
the potential abuse of constitutional law, and its effects of modern society.  Chief Justice 
Roberts stated:  
Just over a century ago, Arizona became the second State in the Union to  
ratify the Seventeenth Amendment. That amendment transferred power to 
choose United States senators from “the Legislature” of each State, Art. I, §3,  
to “the people thereof.”  The amendment resulted from an arduous,  
decades-long campaign in which reformers across the country worked hard  
to garner approval from Congress and three-quarters of the States. What 
chumps! Didn’t they realize that all they had to do was interpret the  
constitutional term “the Legislature” to mean “the people”?  The Court today 
performs just such a magic trick with the Elections Clause.  Art. I, §4.  That 
Clause vests congressional redistricting authority in “the Legislature” of each 
State… Indeed, several provisions expressly distinguish “the  
Legislature” from “the People.”  See Art. I, §2; Amendment 17.  This Court  
has accordingly defined “the Legislature” in the Elections Clause as “the 
representative body which makes the laws of the people.”…  The majority 
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largely ignores this evidence, relying instead on disconnected observations  
about direct democracy, a contorted interpretation of an irrelevant statute,  
and naked appeals to public policy…78 
 
 Chief Justice John Roberts’s opinion of the Seventeenth Amendment is that it 
forced the relinquishment of power by the states to the general voting population, 
something that has flowed naturally to legislatures redefining original intent in order to 
suit the needs of the moment.  A small but vocal group of politicians, journalists, special 
interests, and regular citizens have in recent years remarked at the potential issues that 
the Seventeenth Amendment has given rise to.  Former Texas Governor and current 
Presidential Cabinet member Rick Perry, former Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, 
and columnist George Will have publicly discussed issues pertaining to the lack of 
federalism and state representation in the federal government over-all and in the United 
States Senate in particular.  Though not truly a consistently discussed issue in research, 
articles, or television news programs, the idea of proper representation of state 
legislatures at the national level is in the background.79   
 Even with the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, there have still been 
many incidents of malfeasance, even as recently as November of 2017 and the 
indictment of New Jersey United States Senator Robert Menendez for alleged corrupt 
activities, as covered in countless media sources such as the New York Times,80 
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CNN,81 the Wall Street Journal,82 and almost any nationally syndicated news outlet.  
Though at the time of this writing Senator Menendez’s case had ended in a mistrial and 
the United States attorney determined to not to attempt another try at a conviction, the 
fact is that allegations of corruption are not proof of bad acts.  Though not a perfect 
method of choosing a senator, it can be reasoned that the senatorial selection process, 
as set up in the original version of the United States Constitution, was not the primary 
reason acts of corruption happened, the primary concern itself being human infallibility.   
 Far from providing a panacea, the track record of the United States Senate since 
the passage of the Seventeenth has not been to any real extent different than the 
perceived issues of the pre-Amendment era.  Select examples include a long ranging 
set of senators and people in affiliated positions that have been involved in less than 
ethical behavior.  
• In 1924 Albert B. Fall, Republican of New Mexico, and the newly appointed 
Secretary of the Interior, was a principal character in the Teapot Dome scandal, 
transferring naval oil reserves in Wyoming to private interests that he had been 
allied with during his time in the Senate.83 
• In 2004 the Democrat dominated Massachusetts state legislature voted to 
remove the governor’s right to select a representative for an open Senate seat.  
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The governor was Republican Mitt Romney, and the legislators feared that if the 
then current Senator John Kerry was successful in his objective of being elected 
as the United States Vice President a Republican would be selected in his stead.  
In 2009 the legislature voted to return the right of Senate selection to the 
governor, by this time Democrat Deval Patrick.  This was in response to the 
death of Edward (Ted) Kennedy’s and his newly opened seat.84 
• In 2008 a blatantly illegal activity came to light in Illinois as Governor Rod 
Blagojevich solicited bribes in exchange for the Senate seat opened up by the 
election of Barrack Obama as United States President.  He was recorded making 
expletive-laced statements commenting on the extreme value of the position and 
the need to be properly compensated for the appointment.  He was eventually 
removed from office for his efforts and was sentenced to time in a federal 
prison.85 This circumstance an unethical appointment of a senator by a governor 
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has been the only documented case of allegations of corruption in an 
appointment since the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment.86 
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The Seventeenth Amendment: Needed Modification or a Violation of States 
Rights? 
 The Seventeenth Amendment was an unneeded action leading to the weakening 
of the supremacy the individual states.  The original intent of the Constitutional 
Convention and its original idea for the United States Senate was senators as 
representatives to the states, not directly for the people of those states.  The ratification 
of the Seventeenth Amendment has degraded what was a genuine and needed check 
against popular opinion and spur of the moment decision making.  Instead of the 
illustrious deliberative body it was designed to be, the Senate has been reduced to a 
pedestrian representative organization, little different from the House of 
Representatives, which it was designed to counter.  The Seventeenth Amendment 
completed the most noteworthy and significant change in the Senate’s history and 
formed a deviation from the Constitution’s original intent, which was the corporate 
representation of the individual states on the national stage.1 
 With the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment there was hyperbole from both 
proponents and opponents of the change.  Senator George F. Hoar of Massachusetts 
stated, “Let no man deceive himself into the belief that if this change is made, the 
Senate of the United States will long endure.”2   Senator Porter McCumber of North 
Dakota feared that direct elections would lead to the collapse of the political parties. 
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Idaho Republican Weldon Heyburn, who issued the following challenge to his Senate 
colleagues:  
I should like to see some Senator rise in his seat and say that the  
legislature of his state which elected him was not competent, was not fit,  
was not honest enough to be trusted. Then I should be interested to see 
him go back and say "I am a candidate for reelection." 
 
 Supporters stated that direct elections would eradicate graft, bribery, and corruption, so 
revitalizing the political system from the individual voter all the way up to the highest 
reaches of government.3 
 By compiling the available information, it is quite apparent that though there 
certainly was corruption present before 1913 in the United States Senate, along with 
other levels of government, this was not the primary reason for the passage of the 
Seventeenth Amendment.  It has been maintained that the Seventeenth Amendment 
was a Progressive Era overreach that could have been resolved through legislative 
processes at the individual state level, and was decidedly not in need of the extreme 
measure of developing and ratifying a constitutional amendment.   
 Though not scholarly in any way, there is an interesting, though probably fictional, 
story frequently quoted to argue the differences between the House and Senate.  There is 
no real evidence that this conversation actually took place, as its first mention seems to be 
in an 1884 edition of Harper’s New Monthly Magazine and shortly thereafter in a work by 
M.D. Conway on Edmund Randolph.4  It involves a discussion between George 
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Washington, who was supposed to have a favorable opinion of a bicameral Congress and 
Thomas Jefferson, who thought a second chamber was unnecessary. The gist of the story 
goes that the two men were discussing the issue while drinking coffee. Washington asked 
Jefferson, "Why did you pour that coffee into your saucer?" "To cool it," replied Jefferson. 
"Even so," said Washington, "we pour legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool it."  It can 
easily be used to show in a basic sense the reasoning behind the establishment of the 
United States Senate and the rationale of its selection process and almost lethargic 
pace of legislating.  This idea is supported by John Jay’s discussion in Federalist 64 
where on the subject of the appointment of senators by state legislatures he states: 
This mode has, in such cases, vastly the advantage of elections by the  
people in their collective capacity, where the activity of party zeal, taking 
advantage of the supineness, the ignorance, and the hopes and fears of  
the unwary and interested, often places men in office by the votes of a  
small proportion of the electors.5 
   
 Jay, who after helping to lead debates on the writing and adoption of the 
Constitution distinguished himself as the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court, goes on further to argue that the equal representation of states in the Senate, by 
the most able and willing men, will better represent their constituents, in this specific 
case, the state governments.6   
 The argument of states’ rights has also been raised in conjunction with the 
elimination of the state representation that the Senate was supposed to provide along 
with the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment.  Advocates for this idea put a greater 
emphasis on regional and state governments over the federal, logically assessing that 
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the lower the level of government involved, the more responsive it can be to any 
particular situation and closer to the people that will be effected the greatest by any 
particular decision.7  States could have, on their own, come up with whatever policy 
they would have desired with either specific legislation or a less aggressive version of 
the Seventeenth Amendment that could have still allowed for an adaptation of the 
selection process or a some supplementary version of an elective route, but still 
allowing the individual states the ability to decide the proper route for their senatorial 
representatives.  State legislatures that did not go along with their constituencies’ 
wishes as to how to choose a senator could very well be pushed out in the next election 
cycle, so indirectly the people had always had the power over the choice of senator. 
 The Seventeenth Amendment itself was rapidly passed, allowing for the direct 
election of United States senators, but that idea belies the fact that the push for such an 
amendment was almost eighty years old in 1913.  It remains the only fundamental 
change in constitutional structure of a national government institution that was the 
object of a popular movement for government reform.  By removing the selection of 
senators from the state legislatures and giving the voting population the right to choose, 
the amendment removed the exclusivity of the Senate as a legislative body and became 
no different than the House of Representatives.8 Though the idea was pushed for such 
a long period of time by various elements, the pressure grew in the twenty years leading 
up to the amendment’s passage when proponents of populist government started to 
gain national influence.  
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 Different scholars have reasoned that the Seventeenth Amendment has tipped 
the scales of federal-state power away from one of general equality and in favor of the 
federal government.  A primary argument supporting this centers on the idea that the 
elimination of a direct voice for state legislatures in the United States Congress has 
decreased the protection of state interests at the federal level while giving the general 
public too much say in how government should operate.  Discussion even goes as far 
as to say that the federal government is more apt to infringe on the sovereignty of the 
states since the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment, with even the federal 
judiciary more willing to challenge state laws.  It cannot be fully known if this is directly 
tied to the passage of the amendment, but the timing lines up and it can be reasoned 
that since federal judiciary appointments have to go through the Senate, having less 
influence by state legislatures reduces the potential influence states have over judges.9 
 This paper argues that the Seventeenth Amendment, and the direct election of 
United States senators, was an unnecessary alteration of the power the states were 
guaranteed under the original version of the United States Constitution and has 
diminished what was a legitimate and appropriate check against momentarily popular 
opinions, hot tempers, and the tyranny of the majority.  Instead, what has developed is a 
rather conventional representative body, with few substantial legislative differences from 
the already existing House of Representatives, an institution that it was initially designed 
to moderate and even to counteract when it might be deemed necessary. 
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 With the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, state legislatures willingly, 
some even enthusiastically, relinquished control over the selection of senators, 
undoubtedly one of their biggest sources of influence over national level politics, and 
abandoned the decision-making process to the general electorate.  The House of 
Representatives and Senate were essentially involuntarily forced into this position as 
three-quarters of state legislatures had agreed on the proposed amendment as 
Progressive lawmakers started rapidly gaining control at all levels of government.10 The 
altering of the United States Constitution with the adoption of the Seventeenth 
Amendment and the direct election of senators was supposed to counter the apparent 
ethical issues that seemed to be quite common in the later half 19th century and in the 
first decade of the 20th century.  The idea that it was also theoretically going to better 
“represent” the citizenry is anathema to the concept of state corporate representation 
and has directly contributed to the degradation of the once distinguished role of the 
United States senator.  Once a member of the world’s greatest debating society, a 
senator can now be seen as a representative that merely serves for six instead of two 
years, no longer prideful and honorable, but instead forced to harp about gas prices, 
kissing babies, and other minutia. 
 As designed in the Constitutional Convention, different constituencies for the two 
houses of Congress help to protect the public by ensuring that legislation represents the 
views of at least a majority of the general public.  By having two different methods of 
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selecting representatives and senators any law or resolution must first be approved by 
the majority of the people, then by the majority of the states.11   
 Though different political factors affect senators and representatives, since the 
passage of the Seventeenth Amendment they have become more similar in their 
composition and arguably the Senate has become more politically monolithic, contrary 
to the original intent of the Constitution.  Instead of wide ranging debates and worry 
about opinions of home state legislators, senators are now obligated to concede to the 
general public’s opinion.  Senators are also forced to spend more attention and 
resources on constituent service.12 The Seventeenth Amendment ensured that the 
Senate was no longer a representative of the individual states and their governments, 
but directly to the people of the state instead.  The direct elections of senators 
established a relationship of electoral accountability between senators and the people of 
the states, going around the state level institutions it was initially designed to support, 
and concealed much of the Senate’s explicitly federal character.13  
 Senators, and prospective members of the body, can now more easily use 
hyperbolic tirades, questionable electioneering tactics, exaggeration and embellishment, 
along with outright lies in order to gain a six year seat.  The Senate thus has proceeded 
to follow the pathway of the more populist House of Representatives.  In its place of 
being filtered by the presumably less reactionary professional politicians at state levels 
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of government, the ones who can more easily see through short and long term 
negatives and positives in the issues, senators can more easily ride a wave of 
popularity and familiarity into office, no matter how successful their legislative record 
actually is proven to be.  Ironically, changing senatorial selection process to a direct 
election route has not led to a significant change in the overall public perception of the 
body.  Since the Constitutional Convention the Senate has been both celebrated as 
bastion of renowned actions, good sense, and open debate, or contrarily, a black hole 
of progress.14 It can be contended that if this is the case, perhaps the United States 
Senate would be better off being reestablished as true representatives of the individual 
state governments and not popular public opinion.  Giving power back to the separate 
states could put a brake on how legislation is passed at the national level and potentially 
force a much longer termed view as to the pros and cons of any particular piece of 
legislation. 
 The passage of the Seventeenth Amendment led to significant changes in the 
functioning of the federal government and to the body of the Senate and has notionally 
led to the democratization of the entire legislative branch.  The impression of the 
democratization of the Senate may very well seem to the modern reader as a rather 
noble ideal.  While on its face this might be true, the amendment has taken away one 
of, if not the primary, purpose of the senatorial selection process, the corporate 
representation of the individual states on the national scene.  The previously tight 
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relationship of the senator and their individual state legislature is now weakened, and in 
some cases, nonexistent.15   
 Since the amendment essentially stripped state legislatures of their appointment 
powers and sent this decision to the voting base, it is easy to decide that the 
Seventeenth Amendment was a highly democratizing action, bringing senatorial position 
choices to the masses.  The second clause though, added a provision that proves to be 
potentially more undemocratic than the original selection process entailed.  This 
particular clause allows for vacancies to be filled in an unchecked and undemocratic 
process, stating: “the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to 
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the 
legislatures may direct.”16  Essentially, state governors may be allowed to pick any 
person they see as fit for the position in the event a seat is vacated.   
 At present, thirty-three states permit governors to select senators with no 
apparent checks on the process, and as for having special elections to actually elect a 
replacement senator many of the same issues that originally led to the amendment’s 
passage still remain a substantial issue, typically, bicameral legislatures divided 
between the major political parties, and strong minority parties kyboshing forward 
movement.  As shown previously, this can have negative outcomes as some state 
leaders such as the Massachusetts legislature and Governor Blagojevich of Illinois play 
political brinksmanship or, grotesquely enough, unadorned criminal activity in the 
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selection process of new senators.17 These issues, though exceptionally rare, have 
allowed the Senate to still be looked at in a suspicious and skeptical way, lowering 
public confidence in the institution just as much as any perceived scandal in the pre-
senatorial election period. 
 The Progressive Era has come to symbolize the potential of political activism to 
change society for the better, but the benefit of time has shown that the Seventeenth 
Amendment was a solution to a problem that was not as severe as many suspect, has 
besmirched the original intent of the United States Constitution, and has dramatically 
changed the character of United States senators.  What may seem as a small detail, 
has had a tremendous effect on the structure and daily workings of the United States 
Senate.  The simple fact that senators are now obliged to spend a disproportionate 
amount of time cultivating constituent relationships instead of legislating means they 
spend less time governing and more time preparing for the next election cycle.18  The 
supremacy of the federal prerogative over the idea of states’ rights in many segments of 
American life has been evident since the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment.  
Since the Progressive Era there has been a growing push to centralize as much power 
as possible into the realm of the federal government, taking away powers that had 
                                                          
 17 Daniel T. Shedd. "Money for Senate Seats and Other Seventeenth Amendment Politicking: How to 
Amend the Constitution to Prevent Political Scandal during the Filling of Senate Vacancies," George Washington 
Law Review vol. 79, no. 3, April 2011. p. 963. 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C33&q=Shedd%2C+Daniel+T.+%22Money+for+Senate+Sea
ts+and+Other+Seventeenth+Amendment+Politicking%3A+How+to+Amend+the+Constitution+to+Prevent+Political
+Scandal+during+the+Filling+of+Senate+Vacancies%2C%22+George+Washington+Law+Review+vol.+79%2C+no.+3
+%28April+2011%29%3A+p.+960- 994.&btnG=. Accessed online 7 January 2018. 
 18 Frances E. Lee and Bruce Oppenheimer. Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal 
Representation.  Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.  1999. p. 99. 
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originally been the purview of the individual states, per Article V and the Ninth and 
Tenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.19   
 Many of the apparent issues with the selection of United States senators were 
seen as the vaunted “Robber Barons” of the late 19th and early 20th century having 
much too large of an impact on all levels of government, up to and including the outright 
purchase of senatorial loyalty.  Other plausible ideas as to how to fix these issues could 
have possibly lowered external influence on the legislative process without dramatically 
changing the Constitution.  There has never been a strictly enforced ban on outside 
incomes except for specific reasons by representatives and senators, an issue that still 
stands to this day.  Instead of the captains of industry of years past, there are now 
lobbyists, corporate interests, and special interests doing much the same, but now 
referring to the system as fundraising instead of bribery.  The difference is that now 
senators basically have to partake in the malfeasance, whereas in the previous era 
some might very well have accepted money or favors, but a good number had no 
reason to just to keep their position.  If ethics was really of such a great concern there 
are many ways that ethics laws could have been made stronger and wide ranging. 
 Contrary to most modern perceptions as to why the Seventeenth Amendment 
was passed, it was seen as important to have direct elections of United States senators 
not because of fraud, nepotism, or blatant disregard of the law or tradition, but primarily 
because some states, at times, had years of no proper representation.  For most of the 
19th and early 20th centuries state legislatures met for mere months a year, often times 
on a biennial basis, with state specific constitutional mandates that they end legislative 
                                                          
 19 The Constitution of the United States. Article V; Amendment 9; Amendment 10. 
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sessions on a specific date.  This ensured that a deadlocked legislature could not 
appoint a senator to represent their state, as mandated by the United States 
Constitution.20 Shockingly, many state legislatures saw the amendment as was way to 
ensure proper representation for the state.  Though a perfect answer does not exist the 
issues of nonrepresentation and malfeasance could have been mitigated by any 
number of means. The most obvious idea is with modern state legislatures and their 
more permanent status as full time legislatures.  Though not intended to be life-long 
careers by the members of the Constitutional Convention generation, many positions in 
government have become that.  As the profession matured it can be hoped that each 
state could have decided how best to decide on how to choose a senator.  As state 
legislatures went from meeting for weeks and months to an almost year-round basis, 
there would not be the same artificial time constraints either.  As a failsafe laws could 
have been enacted that pressured individual legislators by allowing the governor of the 
state to select a new senator if the position remained open after a particular amount of 
time.  Though this paper has shown that these are not ideal, it does allow for the 
acceptance of the reality that such an important position as senator may cause a 
significant amount of arguing from varied interests inside of a state’s political hierarchy.  
Since most modern state legislatures now meet on a basically fulltime or at least year 
round basis, with Texas being a notable exception, ensuring that open senatorial seats 
would no longer be as serious, or at minimum, long lived an issue, as a senator would 
most likely eventually be chosen. The passage of the Seventeenth Amendment further 
                                                          
 20 Kris E. Palmer. Constitutional Amendments, 1789 to the Present. Detroit, MI: Gale Group, 2000. p. 406. 
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democratized the Constitution and tied the legislative branch closer to the people, but it 
undermined the links between the state and the federal systems.21   
An Interesting Aside 
 Under Article V of the Constitution, it is stated that Congress must call a 
Constitutional Convention for proposing amendments when two-thirds of the state 
legislatures apply for one.  Since changing the Constitution in a way that would 
detrimentally affect the members of the Senate was not going to make it past the entire 
Congress without an enormous amount of external influence, the Seventeenth 
Amendment was the only amendment in United States history to be originally initiated at 
the state level.  Due to this inordinate amount of pressure Congress pushed it through 
before the Convention would have become mandated.  Had a full Constitutional 
Convention been called the entire United States Constitution could have been rewritten, 
affecting the entire document, and not just necessarily how United States senators were 
chosen.22 
  
                                                          
 21 John R. Vile. A Companion to the United States Constitution and Its Amendments. Santa Barbara, CA: 
Praeger, 2010. p. 197. 
 22 David E. Kyvig. Unintended Consequences of Constitutional Amendments. Athens, GA: University of 
Georgia Press, 2000. 
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